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Between April 16, 2007, and December 14, 2012, the United States has seen 25 mass 
shootings, seven of which occurred in 2012.  A report by United States Department of 
Homeland Security, in 2009, suggested that the United States will be the target of a 
terrorist act that could cause a high number of casualties.   
The November 26, 2008, attack on Mumbai is a transparent example of how 
determined terrorists, trained to die fighting, can bring a large metropolitan city to its 
knees.  It is entirely probable that Mumbai-type attacks could occur in the United States.  
Since the local law enforcement respond to attacks in progress, any active shooter event 
would be handled by the local jurisdiction.  Many law enforcement agencies have begun 
to incorporate tactical plans to respond to Mumbai-type terrorist attacks. 
This thesis focused on police preparedness of select large metropolitan law 
enforcement agencies for potential Mumbai-type terrorist attacks.  A comparative 
analysis of these police agencies was conducted, which showed that the frequency of 
training was found to be varying and inadequate by these agencies.  A similar concern 
was that none of the agencies had equipped all the police officers with rifles, which were 
deemed critical to engage well-equipped active shooters.   
It is the conclusion of the thesis that gaps in preparedness exist and law 
enforcement organizations have room for improvement.  It was also concluded that 
agencies need to enhance communication capability between neighboring jurisdictions 
and focus on triage of the victims during the early stages of attacks when medical 
personnel would be unable to approach. 
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Defining terrorism is an effort fraught with controversy.  Due to the complexities 
of the phenomenon, political dimensions of the issue, conflicting self-interests, 
ideological differences, and alternative perceptions of the events, agreements or 
consensus over a singular uniform definition of terrorism has been conspicuous by its 
absence (Saul, 2005).  As Hoffman (2006) demonstrates, the meaning of the term has 
changed frequently during the last two centuries.  However, despite the numerous extant 
definitions of terrorism, certain common features can be outlined and a general 
comprehensive definition be offered. 
For the purpose of this thesis, Moghaddam’s (2006) definition of terrorism, “the 
politically motivated violence, perpetrated by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored 
agents, intended to bring about feelings of terror and helplessness in a population in order 
to influence decision-making and to change behavior,” will be used.  Although the events 
of September 11, 2001, gave a warning to the United States that spectacular and high 
casualty terrorism had arrived in U.S., the nation had faced terrorism throughout its 
history.  While the central concepts of terrorism, including coercive and political nature 
of violence on non-combatant populations may stay constant, the strategies employed by 
terrorism are dynamic—as evidenced by the evolving tactics of terrorists (Garrison, 2003; 
Philipps, 2010). 
The 9/11 attacks were unusual as they employed commercial aviation crafts as 
lethal and effective bombs.  However, the tactics used by the Al-Qa’ida was not unusual 
as it utilized a relatively older method of attack—suicide bombing.  The tactical evolution 
of terrorist attacks confounds governments and responding agencies since preventive 
methods almost always invariably focus on the last major attack as the guiding factor.  
The 9/11 attacks caused a significant response by the U.S. government, and, since that 
time, the United States has spent a tremendous amount of time, money and lives of 
American soldiers to fight a nebulous war on terrorism (Stiglitz, 2011).  Seven years 
later, on November 26, 2008, a further evolution of terrorist strategy was observed in 
Mumbai, India, when four teams of 10 terrorists began a 60-hour-long simultaneous 
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assault in different locations, paralyzing the city known as the commercial hub of India 
and killing more than 170 people.  The attacks were attributed to the Pakistan-based 
terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (Rabasa et al., 2009).   
This terrorist incident revealed that while the sight of planes flying into buildings 
and killing thousands of people created terror in the minds of people, the multiple active 
shooter incidents were equally frightening.  Since the Mumbai attack involved 
determined terrorists using easily available firearms, the logistics of executing such an 
attack was much simpler compared to accomplishing an attack of 9/11 magnitude.  It is 
not improbable that Mumbai-type attacks could occur in the United States (Wyllie, 
2009).1 
While the vulnerability of the United States to al Qaeda-related violence remains 
a possibility, domestic terrorism concerns also pose a risk to the population (Bergen, 
Hoffman, & Tiedemann 2011; Hoffman, 2011).  In 2009, the United States Department 
of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis issued a report warning law 
enforcement that the right-wing extremist activity was on the rise, due to the economy, 
current political climate, and the return of disgruntled war veterans fueling and filling the 
ranks of the white supremacy militias.  The report suggested that “lone wolves and small 
terrorist cells” represented the nation’s biggest terrorist threat because their low profile 
made it difficult to intervene or engage in prevention of their acts (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009).  The same report also indicated that the United 
States will be the target of a terrorist act that could cause a high number of casualties or 
involve the use of victims as tools to gain notoriety or media attention. 
Intelligence acquisition, counter-terrorism, and disruption of terrorist 
organizations historically have required the efforts of a multitude of government 
agencies, which, due to competition, stovepipes, and self-interest failed to share 
                                                 
1The Department of Homeland Security defines an active shooter as: “An Active Shooter is an 
individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most 
cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  Immediate Action/Rapid Deployment (IARD) is defined as, 
“The swift and immediate deployment of law enforcement resources to ongoing, life threatening situations 
where delayed deployment could otherwise result in death or serious bodily injury to innocent persons” 
(LAPD, 2003). 
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information (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
However, even though federal agencies might take a lead when it comes to terrorism-
related intelligence development and counter-terrorism measures, it is the local law 
enforcement agencies that respond first to an act of terrorism on domestic soil.  The risk 
of “active shooters” causing mass casualties has been ever present in the United States, as 
evidenced by numerous recent events in which an individual armed with firearms has 
quickly killed several people even before the law enforcement could respond.  Between 
2006 and 2012, United States has witnessed 25 mass shootings, seven of which took 
place in 2012 (Follman, Aronsen, & Pan, 2013).  Follman et al. (2012) found that the rate 
of mass shootings has increased in recent years.   
On April 16, 2007, a gunman shot and killed 32 people and wounded 17 others in 
two separate attacks, approximately two hours apart, before committing suicide, on the 
campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia.  
This was the deadliest shooting incident by a single gunman in U.S. history (Hauser & 
O’Connor, 2007).  In a mass murder event, on November 5, 2009, at Fort Hood military 
base outside Killeen, Texas, a single gunman, Major Nidal Hasan, shot to death 13 people 
and wounded 30 (Mackey, 2009).  On January 8, 2011, a gunman shot U.S. 
Representative Gabrielle Giffords and 18 others in Tucson, Arizona, killing 6 people, 
including the chief judge for the United States District Court for Arizona (Lacey & 
Herszenhorn, 2011).  On August 5, 2012, in an attack on a Sikh temple, a gunman shot 
and killed six and wounded 3 in Oak Creek, Wisconsin (Yaccino, Schwirtz, & Santora, 
2012).  In July, 2012, a former Ph.D. student massacred 12 and wounded 58 using 
firearms in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado (Frosch & Johnson, 2012).  On 
December 14, 2012, in Newtown, Connecticut, Adam Lanza used a .223 Bushmaster 
semi-automatic rifle to massacre 20 school children and six adults (Barron, 2012).    
These incidents raise a troubling question about the preparation of local law 
enforcement agencies.  If a single shooter, as in the Virginia Tech incident, can kill 32 
individuals before a halt to the spree of violence is affected, what kind of damage a 
multiple group of terrorists, bent upon achieving maximum casualty rate and dedicated to 
their suicide mission, could cause?  The potential for mass murders would exponentially 
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increase if multiple active shooters, driven by a suicide mission, were to target high-
population density locales.  Such potential threats, whether emerging from 
psychologically imbalanced single shooters or from religiously-driven Fidayeen suicide 
squad terrorists as in Mumbai require a different dynamic and strategy from the first 
responding police officers compared to the “usual” law and order policing.  Law 
enforcement agencies need to adjust and respond to emerging tactics employed by 
terrorists, such as those observed in Mumbai, India and also to anticipate potential new 
avenues of attacks on communities in America. 
Many law enforcement agencies have begun to incorporate a concept called the 
Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) to respond to Mumbai-
type terrorist attacks (Chudwin, 2011).  The MACTAC is an expansion of the IARD 
tactics and MACTAC concepts provide responding officers with dynamic tactics to use 
during an incident involving multiple shooters at multiple locations (Sanow, 2011).  The 
MACTAC concept allows combining of personnel from multiple agencies during 
operations to assist the local jurisdiction responding to a Mumbai-type terrorist attack 
(Sanow, 2011). 
No place is immune to an attack by active shooters.  All public places, especially 
dense urban populations congregating together in malls, public buildings, etc. are targets 
for active shooters (United States Department of Justice, 2006).  Once an active shooter 
initiates an attack, the attack is unlikely to stop until the terrorist’s actions are stopped by 
the first responding police officers, unless the individual commits suicide.  Thus, there is 
a need to provide all patrol officers training to respond to scenarios dealing with active 
shooters.  The academy training also must include active shooter scenarios (Borelli, 
2005).   
This thesis focuses on police preparedness for potential terrorist attacks within the 
United States that could be inspired by the 2008 Mumbai, India attacks.  Furthermore, 
since domestic active shooters pose similar, albeit with potentially lower casualty counts, 
to the public, the thesis also focuses on police preparation for active shooter incidents.  
An analysis of how the various law enforcement agencies in the United States have 
prepared for a Mumbai type incident is provided.  The thesis focuses on major 
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metropolitan police agencies because of the greater likelihood that a Mumbai-type attack 
would occur in larger municipalities which provide a target-rich environment and the 
potential for wide media coverage.  An attack on a major city satisfies objectives of 
terrorist organizations since the level of disruption, fear, and political impact is 
potentially much higher compared to attacks on a smaller jurisdiction.  The research 
seeks to determine what new strategies are being employed by law enforcement agencies 
to effectively defend against Mumbai-style attacks and identifies potential new strategies 
that could be utilized by law enforcement in future. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
Low-probability high-consequence events, also sometimes termed as black swan 
(Taleb, 2010) events, are the most difficult ones to prepare for.  Axiomatically, an 
incident that has not been encountered before could theoretically be prepared for but the 
effectiveness of preparation will never be revealed unless or until such an event takes 
place.  Unfortunately, inadequate preparation and response to a high-consequence event 
carries grave aftermaths.  As the Mumbai-attacks demonstrated, poor response to 
multiple shooter assaults had quite a tragic outcome.  The success of the terrorists to 
attract international media coverage and to effectively paralyze Mumbai, an important 
commercial hub of India, could be construed as a “victory” for the terrorist group. 
As various municipal law enforcement agencies have begun to incorporate   
training to deal with multiple active shooter threats, it is assumed and often proclaimed 
by law enforcement executives that that their agencies are prepared to address a Mumbai-
type incident.  However, no comprehensive analysis of MACTAC training, its 
uniformity, acceptance by the field officers, or effectiveness exists.  Relying on 
assumptions alone regarding preparedness, when it comes to homeland security and 
public safety, leaves critical questions unanswered.  Recent high casualty active shooter 
incidents indicate the potential for mass casualties in case of multiple active shooter 
incidents such as the Mumbai incident.  The law enforcement rapid response or 
MACTAC tactical response is literally in its infancy.  MACTAC is evolving, but has not  
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been battle-tested and thus lies within theoretical confinement.  It is necessary to conduct 
a systematic analysis and assessment of potential law enforcement strategies and 
responses to multiple shooter threat. 
Law enforcement in United States is fragmented across local, state, tribal and 
federal jurisdictions and no uniformity exists in level, uniformity, and quality of training 
across different jurisdictions.  Even though law enforcement agencies across the nation 
have begun to incorporate MACTAC training, it is unknown whether the same term 
MACTAC results in similar or effective training for the first responders in different 
police agencies.   
The null hypothesis to test in this case would be that non-uniform, incongruous, 
and inadequate training (qualitative as well as quantitative) is being provided to field 
personnel in order to deal with multiple shooter threats (Blake, 2011; Lois et al., 2004).  
Such hypothesis would require answers whether current proposed law enforcement 
training (MACTAC or other similar strategies) is appropriate and adequate to deal with 
threats posed by multiple bands of active shooters, arsonists and bombers spread out 
geographically in large metropolitan areas.  This thesis investigates what steps major 
metropolitan police departments have taken to respond to Mumbai-type threats.  A 
comparative analysis of various major law enforcement agencies has the potential to 
provide information that could be used to formulate recommendations dealing with 
calibration of police departments’ strategies on preventing, responding, and recovering 
from a Mumbai-style incident.     
Significance of this study lies in the fact that a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of MACTAC like preparation across different law enforcement agencies does 
not exist.  Such an analysis should not only reveal the steps taken so far by select law 
enforcement agencies to prepare for assaults with high-casualty potential, but also to 
expose possible inadequacies in such preparation.  Thus, the primary benefit of this study 
would be to allow the decision makers to assess MACTAC preparation in high-target 
localities and thereafter calibrate and enhance such preparation.  The comparative 
analysis should identify gaps that must be addressed and provide information that can be 
used to modify, develop and improve existing response plans for law enforcement.  The 
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research also seeks to uncover whether or not the results from the analysis could or 
should be adopted by other agencies.  Since MACTAC is an emerging and untested 
concept and presents many challenges to first responders, it is expected that this research 
should assist with the formulation of policies and strategies to multiple active shooter 
scenarios.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Frazzano’s (2010) research had focused on small jurisdiction’s response to active 
shooters, cross-jurisdictional cooperation, and developing of common lexicon, 
communication and tactics during active shooter scenarios.  This thesis has a different 
focus and perspective.  While Frazzano’s focuses was on smaller jurisdiction’s response, 
the present research focuses on major metropolitan law enforcement, specifically to 
highlight unique concerns facing police departments serving population centers.  While 
major metropolitan law enforcement agencies may not face a lack of human personnel 
resources or even the need for cross-jurisdictional cooperation as compared to smaller 
jurisdictions, training requirements and preparation for an agency with 10,000 sworn 
officers alone present unique challenges.  In this study, the focus is on the following 
questions: 
1. What steps have major metropolitan law enforcement agencies taken and 
tactics implemented to respond to terrorist attacks equivalent to the attacks 
in Mumbai?   
2. Is there any uniformity and consistency in tactics implemented between 
the select agencies used in the study? 
3. What is the perceived level of confidence, within the agency, related to 
implemented strategies, to combat a Mumbai-type attack? 
4. What steps may be required to potentiate the MACTAC tactics to deal 
with Mumbai-type attacks? 
These four questions emerged as critical issues for law enforcement decision 
makers and trainers after a review of the relevant literature and interviews with personnel 




This study is a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental research. The 
methodology employed in this thesis is qualitative analysis, based upon case studies, 
utilizing a generally accepted social science case study approach, incorporating 
comparative analysis of relevant incidents and strategies that have been devised to deal 
with such incidents.  The analytical framework would rely upon assessments of strategic 
and logistical responses framed by select law enforcement agencies to respond to 
multiple active shooter threats.    
Open source information from previous active shooter incidents will serve as the 
basis for both tactical and strategic information and analysis.  These include the 
November 2008 Mumbai, India attacks, the September 2004 Beslan, Russia, massacre, 
the April 1999 Columbine High School massacre, and the February 1997 North 
Hollywood Bank of America robbery.  The incidents were chosen as they represent 
primary issues unique to the threat matrix considered here—that of multiple attackers, 
multiple attack locations, and utilization of firearms and explosives.  Police agencies 
from four major cities, Chicago, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and New York were used for a 
comparative analysis of law enforcement agencies, with a focus on their level of 
planning, preparation and policies for multiple active shooter response.     
The representative sampling focused on Chicago, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and 
New York for the following reasons:  the New York Police Department (NYPD) was 
selected as a representative law enforcement agencies as it is the largest metropolitan 
police agency in terms of the size of the police department, the size of the community it 
serves; it polices a prime terrorism target city, and having been the victim of the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, has had to confront the future threats (Viegas, 2010).  The tactics 
and training selected by the NYPD, thus have critical importance as an evaluative tool.   
Chicago Police Department similarly was chosen due to its size, the large 




terrorism target.  Chicago was the intended target of a thwarted terrorist attack in October 
2010 (Daily Herald, 2010).  Additionally, the Chicago subway system is recognized as 
one of the top terrorist targets (MacNevin, 2005).   
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was selected because it 
serves a commercially important city—a major tourist attraction with large concentrated 
population at any given time.  Hotels in Las Vegas have been listed as United States’ top 
terrorist targets (MacNevin, 2005).  A terrorist attack in Las Vegas would serve multiple 
terrorist objectives, including attacking a symbolic icon, achieving high number of 
casualties, and severely impacting a hotel- and casino-dependent economy.  
Consequently, the LVMPD has expended significant effort in developing tactical 
response to terrorist threats, including multiple active shooter threats.   
Los Angeles, similar to New York, has a large police department and the size of 
the community it serves is spread over 450 square miles.  The infrastructure of Los 
Angeles is considered prime target for terrorists and the city is ranked as the third major 
terrorist target in top five U.S. cities (MacNevin, 2005; Viegas, 2005).  Documentation 
found during the May, 1, 2011, raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan 
confirmed that Los Angeles, Chicago and New York were terrorist targets (Simons, 
2012).  
Data collection relied on open source information, review of existing and 
evolving policies of various law enforcement agencies, and research material available on 
the relevant case studies.  Beyond the open-source data, agency-specific information was 
obtained through the training bureaus of the selected police agencies.  Status of police 
preparedness and training was determined through information received from agency 
training units and management.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data analysis consisted of evaluation of existing, evolving, and planned 
policies of select police agencies as related to multiple active shooter incidents.  
Particular focus was placed on level of preparedness as reflected in the nature and amount 
of training offered to patrol officers as first responders.  Proposed training, specialized 
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resources offered to the line officers (including rifles, video uplink and downlink 
capabilities, armored vehicles), and funding devoted to MACTAC type programs were 
also evaluated.  Although it is difficult to quantify agency preparedness for a potential 
incident never encountered before, training currently offered and in offing is strongly 
suggestive of readiness of an agency to face the eventuality.  Another focus of the 
analysis consisted of identification of potential impediments to successful resolution of 
multiple active shooter incidents.  This analysis was based upon input provided by 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A Mumbai, India style of attack on U.S. soil would have implications that would 
be devastating to the American population.  An attack of this magnitude should be 
understood in order to effectively prepare the most effective possible law enforcement 
response.  The primary sources considered and analyzed for this literature review include 
official governmental reports and documents, which relate to the thesis case studies, as 
well as literature on the topic by assessing the threat, the impact and the preparedness of 
the local law enforcement agencies.  Secondary sources demonstrate the current literature 
on the topic, including books and scholarly journals, and in general demonstrate the 
necessity for law enforcement to be better prepared for this type of attack.  By critically 
examining of the extant literature that deals with active shooter scenarios, an exploration 
into the importance of the local law enforcement agencies’ response will is highlighted 
and gaps in knowledge are identified.  Additionally, this literature review demonstrates 
that “active shooter” scenarios are a trend that law enforcement has to contend with and 
has to be prepared to encounter. 
B. ACTIVE SHOOTER   
An “active shooter” is defined as the “Suspect(s) activity is immediately causing 
death and serious bodily injury.”  The activity is not contained and there is immediate 
risk of death or serious injury to potential victims.  The active shooter scenario is 
dynamic, evolving very rapidly, and demands an immediate deployment of law 
enforcement resources to terminate the life threatening situation (Borelli, 2005).  The 
Department of Homeland Security defines an “active shooter,” as an “individual actively 
engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most 
cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection 
of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the 
immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate 
harm to victims” (United States, Department of Homeland Security, 2008).   
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The New York Police Department (NYPD) defines an “active shooter” as an 
individual engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated 
area, which is very similar to the definition given by the Department of Homeland 
Security.  However, NYPD has limited their definition to include only those cases that 
spill beyond the intended victim to others, meaning that if a grievant has an issue with an 
employer that leads to an attack targeting not only the direct supervisor but also spills 
over to others in the workplace (Kelly, 2011).  The Los Angeles Police Department 
defines an “active shooter” as an armed person who has used deadly force on other 
persons and aggressively continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional 
victims (Bratton, 2003). 
In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis issued a report warning law enforcement that the right-wing 
extremist activity is on the rise, stating this rise is due to the economy, the current 
political climate and the return of disgruntled war veterans that is fueling and filling the 
ranks of the white supremacy militias, (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2009).  The report further states that “lone wolves 
and small terrorist cells” represent the nation’s biggest terrorist threat because their low 
profile making it difficult to intervene before they act (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009).  According to the United States Army (2007):  
Terrorism is a reality of the Contemporary Operational Environment and 
will remain a significant threat for the foreseeable future.  Terrorists may 
target susceptible people, symbols, capabilities, and infrastructure to 
enhance terrorist objectives and diminish the resolve of an adversary.  
Attacks may occur while United States military forces are in the United 
States homeland, in transit to and from missions, and during operational 
deployments around the world. 
According to Borelli, potentially every 9-1-1 call could be placing patrol officers 
and other first responders in a position where they could find themselves facing an Active 
Shooter who is a terrorist armed with several weapons and more than willing to die for 
his/her cause (Borelli, 2005).  As patrol officers, the first responders will not be able to 
set up a perimeter and wait for the SWAT teams to arrive and resolve the situation.  The 
first responders will have to aggressively close on the active shooter and neutralize 
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him/her by arrest or termination.  While Columbine High School brought the need for 
active shooter training and policies to the forefront of the country’s consciousness, we 
have to recognize that the active shooter scenario can occur in any public place.  All 
public places, where there is a dense population of people congregating, are targets for 
active shooters.  Once an active shooter starts, the active shooter is not likely to stop until 
he is forced to cease by actions of the first responding police officers.  For these very 
reasons, all patrol officers should be receiving active shooter resolution training even in 
the entrance level police-training curriculum.  The training will be applicable to shooting 
situations such as the one at Columbine and in the event of terrorist attacks that take on 
this mode of operation (Borelli, 2005).   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) demanded the 
development of the NIMS.  The NIMS system was developed to create an atmosphere 
where the Federal, State, and local governments could work effectively and efficiently 
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 
cause, size, or complexity.  Additionally, the NIMS system was developed to provide for 
interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, to include 
a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident 
command system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified command; training; 
identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of 
resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of 
incident information and incident resources (White House, 2003). 
The National Response Framework (NRF) that was created in March of 2008, 
focused primarily on the command and control aspect of emergency management to an 
all-hazards.  Additionally, it in the area of terror attacks; the NRF focused their response 
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and preventive measures to minimize the impact 
of such attacks (DHS, 2008).  As thorough as this document was, it failed to address 
issues associated with multiple assault active shooter scenarios and only dealt with terror 
attacks by the way of WMD, especially if prevention fails.   
According to the analysis conducted by the New York Police Department 
(NYPD), the attacks in the city of Mumbai, India had remarkably different tactics than 
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other suicide terrorist attacks.  There were no suicide bombers, but the terrorists were 
jihadist as they were prepared to die in gun battles.  The terrorists used military hit and 
run type tactics where they use multiple simultaneous attacks from different entry points 
to overwhelm the Indian security forces ability to react effectively.  The terrorists 
displayed a proficiency in advanced combat techniques including intelligence collection 
and knowledge of terrain and target, speed of execution giving the terrorists the element 
of surprise, weapons proficiency, control of terrain, and rapid neutralization and/or 
separation of targets.  The terrorist tactics fused the placement of explosives at selected 
points to delay the responding forces, backed up with precision firing to employ 
confusion and escalate casualties.  The terrorists operated in military style tactics by 
seizing control of certain properties and symbolically significant locations along with 
temporarily taking hostages to slow responders down (NYPD, 2008).   
New York Police Department Commissioner Raymond Kelly testified at the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs as to the lessons 
learned from the Mumbai attacks.  Kelly stated that the police in Mumbai were not 
adequately trained or armed to sufficiently deal with a military style tactics that the 
terrorists used.  Kelly has instituted training for new recruits that includes assault rifles 
and close quarter battle techniques that would have been useful in the Mumbai attacks 
(Kelly, 2009). 
The Research and Development Corporation (RAND) conducted an analysis of 
the Mumbai terrorist attacks and documented its findings in the Occasional Papers series.  
RAND concluded that the terror attacks were intended to cause fear and alarm the general 
population, but also to inspire terrorist constituencies and attract recruits.  Success in this 
incident meant humiliating the Indian Security Services, causing large-scale death and 
destruction and garnering global media coverage.  Additionally, although local police 
force responded relatively quickly, they lacked both the training to set up appropriate 
Command Posts and the ability to seal off the different attack sites.  Lastly, throughout 
the crisis, the central government and security forces failed to project an image of control 
by publicly using words like “chaos” and “paralysis” repeatedly to describe events as 
they unfolded (RAND Corporation, 2009).   
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The surround, set up a perimeter to contain the suspects, negotiate and await the 
response of SWAT approach has been replaced by the "active shooter protocol."  
Optimally, it calls for a four-person team to advance in a diamond-shaped wedge.  Police 
officers are trained to move toward the sound of gunfire and neutralize the shooter.  The 
goal is to stop the active shooter as quickly as possible (Cullen, 2009). 
The New York Police Department (NYPD) released a report of a study they 
conducted of active shooters (New York City, 2012).  Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly stated, “After the Virginia Tech and Mumbai terrorist attacks, the Police 
Department undertook a statistical analysis of active shooter incidents from 1966 to 
2011.”  The NYPD study looked at 281 active shooter attacks.  They found that 98 
percent of the active shooter incidents were carried out by a single attacker and 36 
percent of active shooter attacks involved more than one weapon.  Additionally, 46 
percent of active shooter attacks ended with force applied by law enforcement, private 
security, or other bystander and 40 percent ended with the attacker committing suicide.   
According to Rivera, the uniqueness of the active shooter has forced law 
enforcement to develop new tactics, techniques and procedures to protect the public 
(Rivera, 2007).  Rivera believes that the burden of protecting against an active shooter 
scenario must be shared by the individual members of the community as these incidents 
are characterized by their unpredictability, the speed in which they occur, and the 
lethality of the act.  Preventing such incidents would require the presence of specially 
trained and equipped law enforcement personnel in every school, university and 
workplace (Rivera, 2007). 
Rivera asserts and demonstrates that active shooter incidents are seldom random 
attacks.  The majority of the cases are premeditated acts in which the perpetrator 
identifies the victim or victims, and searches for them with the intent to kill them (Rivera, 
2007).  The perpetrator will continue to engage targets of opportunity in the process as 
well as afterward.  Loss of life can be mitigated by way of training, preparation and 
response against active shooter scenarios.  Chances are that the shooter will not flee upon 
the arrival of law enforcement.  The active shooter sees the arrival of law enforcement to 
the scene of the crisis as a new target (Rivera, 2007).  
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The Department of Homeland Security teaches that active shooters situations are 
unpredictable and evolve quickly (U.S., Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
Typically, immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the active 
shooter and prevent further harm to victims.  Because the active shooter scenarios are 
usually over within 10 to 15 minutes, before the arrival of law enforcement, individuals 
must be prepared both mentally and physically for these types of situations (U.S., 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  Individuals must have good practices for 
coping with an active shooter situation.  To cope with an active shooter situation, the 
Department of Homeland Security teaches that individuals must be aware of their 
environment and any possible dangers.  Citizens should be cognizant of their two nearest 
exits in any facility they visit.  If one is in an office, they should stay there and secure the 
door.  If in a hallway, they should get into a room and secure the door.  As a last resort 
they should attempt to take the active shooter down, when the shooter is at close range 
and it is not feasible to flee.  Given the described scenario, their only chance for survival 
is much greater if they try to incapacitate the active shooter (U.S., Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008).  When it is safe, individuals should call 9-1-1 (U.S., 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  After teaching this, the Department of 
Homeland Security created a public service announcement teaching the public that their 
survival depends on whether they have a plan to Run, Hide, Fight (U.S., Department of 
Homeland Security, 2012).    
The more prepared law enforcement can be for the shooting's aftermath, the less 
lives may be lost as a result of such a violent act.  In a mass shooting there will be many 
victims with traumatic injuries and there will be a need to prioritize victims and 
administer advanced first aid.  In active shooter situations formally trained medical 
personnel often cannot be on the scene immediately to provide casualty care, thus 
responding officers must be educated and trained in immediate casualty care techniques 
to help save lives.  In ALERRT's Terrorism Response Tactics: Active Shooter Level II 
Training, funded by grants from the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance 
and the State of Texas, officers learn self-aid, buddy-aid techniques, and basic means of 
treating the wounded (Garrett, 2012). 
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C. CONCLUSION 
This critical analysis of the extant literature identified and considered the key 
sources and materials related to active shooter attacks using a military tactics to 
overwhelm the opposing forces.  In particular the literature demonstrates that a planned 
attack using assault type weaponry is not as deadly as those attacks using mass bombings 
or an IED.  However, the active shooter tactic has the potential to create long-drawn-out 
pandemonium in a highly dense and populated city necessitating that law enforcement 
leaders consider in detail the preparations and response most capable of protecting 
citizens at risk.  Sustained attacks of the type carried out in Mumbai, India, North 
Hollywood and others, can impact a region’s economy as the violence may deter people 
from regular commerce.  There have been signs of greater violence and frequency with 
regard to the past school shootings that analysts should consider as potential indicators 
for future violence.  However, to predict this type of violence would be impossible partly 
because as commonplace as these calamities seem, they are relatively rare crimes 
(Tanner, 2012). 
One of the main considerations for analysts of the literature related to the Mumbai 
attacks is that a small number of well-trained terrorist attackers with determination and a 
well thought out plan can cause major damage (McJunkin, 2009).  Conversely, a well 
thought out plan for survival—before the event occurs—can mean the difference between 
living and dying.       
This literature review highlights the need to create a law enforcement response 
plan to a Mumbai-type attack.  However, due to the unique threat that first responders 
had not faced before in a Mumbai style attack, plans and preparation to address such 
attacks are in an unchartered territory.  It is difficult to analyze with certainty how such 
plans may succeed unless an event of Mumbai’s magnitude occurs.  The criticality of the 
issue demands that such planning and preparation be evaluated in a scholarly and 
dispassionate manger, thus allowing potential policy implications to emerge as the 
research reveals gaps.    
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This thesis focuses on an assessment of law enforcement’s planning for a multiple 
location with multiple suspects attack, similar to the Mumbai-style attack in India.  
Additionally, a comparative analysis of major city law enforcement’s preparation was 
conducted to contrast the planning and preparation of the different law enforcement 
agencies.  It is expected that the assessment and analysis would assist with an adaptive 
modulation of existing policy and to improve the success of these critical threat-
neutralizing efforts in homeland security.  The thesis now moves to consider the relevant 







III. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines and analyzes specific high-profile incidents with particular 
relevance to homeland security as well as public safety.  The selected incidents were 
significant events in the active shooter arena, drew national attention, or forced the police 
to modify their tactics in response to these types of events.  This chapter explores the 
incidents, provides a background within the context of threats and their mitigation, 
identifies the lessons learned.  The cases analyzed were:  
1. North Hollywood, California bank robbery and shootout, 1997;  
2. Columbine High School massacre, Colorado, 1999;  
3. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University massacre, 2007;  
4. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords shooting, Tucson, Arizona, 2011;  
5. Aurora Colorado movie theater shooting, 2012;  
6. Beslan, Russia school massacre, 2004; and  
7. Mumbai, India terrorist attacks, 2008.   
The Mumbai attacks and the Beslan massacre were selected as international case 
studies because of the unique terrorist threats presented by them.  In both the incidents, 
the terrorists utilized military style tactics in their attacks, and, since an attack of this 
nature has not occurred in the United States, the preparation of police agencies to deal 
with such attacks remains untested. 
While the police in India and Russia should not be considered commensurate with 
the law enforcement agencies in the United States, lessons can be learned from the 
Mumbai attacks and the Beslan massacre to better shape law enforcement response in the 
United States.  Several incidents within the United States were selected as case studies 
with regard to the law enforcement response. 
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B. DOMESTIC ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS NORTH HOLLYWOOD 
BANK ROBBERY AND SHOOTOUT 
On February 28, 1997, Larry Phillips, Jr. and Emil Matasareanu robbed the North 
Hollywood branch of the Bank of America, located at 6600 Laurel Canyon Boulevard 
(Yusof, 2012).  Prior to this robbery, Phillips and Matasareanu had stolen nearly $2 
million in various heists, including three attacks on armored cars and two previous bank 
holdups (Smith, Weinstein, & Riccardi, 1997).  Their modus operandi consisted of using 
full body armor, military firearms, and engaging in “takeover” style robberies (Coffin, 
2007).  
During the North Hollywood robbery, Phillips and Matasareanu were clad in body 
armor and were armed with five rifles, one handgun and 3,300 rounds of ammunition.  
Their robbery attempt was observed by two LAPD officers who requested help, 
consequently resulting in a city-wide police response to the emerging incident 
(McCarthy, 2004).  The officers heard gun fire from the bank as Phillips and Matasareanu 
fired several rounds inside the bank to frighten the employee and to ensure that no one 
resisted their robbery attempt.  The officers put out an “officer needs help” call that put 
the entire city on high alert.  Within minutes, more police arrived on the scene in 
response, in part because the North Hollywood police station was only two miles away 
from the targeted bank.  The attempts by officers to lock down the bank and contain the 
robbers were complicated by the sound of automatic gunfire (Coffin, 2007).   
As they exited the bank, Phillips and Matasareanu were confronted by LAPD 
officers and a shootout ensued.  Phillips and Matasareanu attempted to flee the scene, 
Phillips on foot and Matasareanu in their getaway vehicle, while continuing to engage the 
officers.  It was apparent that Phillips and Matasareanu were attempting an escape the 
dragnet; however, because of the significant police presence—around 350 officers 
eventually responded to the shootout—the two suspects focused their attention on the 
police officers and continued to engage the officers with gunfire.  
The shootout continued onto a residential street adjacent to the bank until Phillips 
was mortally wounded as he was shot 11 times; including one self-inflicted gunshot 
wound (Mako, 2007).  Matasareanu was killed by SWAT officers three blocks away and 
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was shot 29 times.  Phillips and Matasareanu were being investigated for having robbed 
two other banks using virtually identical methods by taking control of the entire bank and 
firing automatic weapons for control and entry past bullet-proof security doors (Mako, 
2007). 
Los Angeles police officers encountered several logistical difficulties while 
confronting the robbery suspects.  Eventually, these deficiencies lead to policy changes, 
especially related to equipping officers with more powerful weaponry.  The officers were 
armed with their personal 9mm or LAPD issued.38 caliber pistols, while some of the 
officers carried 12 gauge shotguns.  Phillips and Matasareanu carried illegally modified 
fully automatic AKM rifle and an AR-15 rifle with high capacity drum magazines and 
ammunition capable of penetrating police body armor.  Both wore full-body armor which 
made police handguns ineffective as the handgun bullets did not have the capability of 
penetrating the body armor 
The responding officers faced the additional challenge besides ineffective 
firepower since the two robbers carried automatic rifles with long-range accuracy and 
lethality.  As officers bullets struck the suspects, the suspects retaliated with a hail of 
automatic gunfire (LAPD, 1997).  To overcome firepower deficiency and to replenish 
their depleting ammunition, officers were forced to seek assistance from a nearby gun 
store to obtain weaponry and ammunition that could match that of Phillips and 
Matasareanu.   
When the North Hollywood incident occurred, patrol officers were not trained in 
rapid intervention tactics.  The LAPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) eventually 
arrived with rifles powerful enough to penetrate the body armor.  The SWAT response 
took 19 minutes, which was considered a very rapid response for a specialized unit to a 
distant response location (LAPD, 1997).  The SWAT team was armed with MP5, M26, 
H&K .223, and AR 15 rifles.  With SWAT’s arrival; the police were finally able to match 
the firepower of the two suspects.  The Los Angeles Police Department SWAT team 
trains and works together as a unified team.  This allowed the team to work seamlessly 
together to stop the assault (LAPD, 1997).  The Los Angeles Police Department, a large 
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agency numbering just under 10,000 sworn personnel, was able to provide 350 officers to 
the scene (Wilcox, Van Derbeken, & DeSantis, 2010).  
The North Hollywood incident involved two active shooters with a single 
objective of escaping apprehension.  The planning by the robbers was to commit their 
crime and make an expeditious escape even if their retreat required killing civilians and 
police in their path.  The response of the police forced the robbers into a situation where 
they could submit to apprehension or engage in aggressive maneuvers while attempting 
to escape, instead of surrendering.  Several critical lessons were learned from the 
incident.  The shootout revealed that the patrol officers were ill equipped to engage and 
defeat determined criminals who had an advantage of being armed with easily available 
rifles, powerful ammunition, and body armor.  It was only after this incident that 
municipal police agencies began to equip officers with high powered rifles and stronger 
caliber pistols.  Besides the lack of advantage due to equipment, the incident was marked 
with a lack of command and control (Newton & Shuster, 1997).  In a chaotic situation 
where numerous gunshots are being fired, suspects are constantly on the move, and 
suspects are protected against officers’ ammunition, initial chaos could be expected but 
following of an Incident Command System protocol and better training and preparation 
would have helped the responding officers.  The most critical lesson is that two well-
equipped bank robbers, possessing weapons which a person could acquire without much 
inconvenience in U.S., could hold off hundreds of officers and engage them for 
approximately 45 minutes (Caprarelli & Mindham, 2011).   
The North Hollywood incident, though clearly not a politically motivated terrorist 
attack, is important and instructional to the research at hand. Though these criminals were 
motivated by greed rather than political, religious or social commitment found in 
terrorism, they were easily capable of resisting one of the most prepared and effective 
law enforcement agencies in the nation. The presence of armed and trained police 
responding quickly to the scene was insufficient to deter the criminals. Instead, the 




believing that even if interrupted in the commission of their crime they would be able to 
make an escape using extreme violence against the public and even the lighter armed 
police that responded.  
One must question how much more could this incident inform us about the 
perceived greater commitment to terrorist ideologies. The attack revealed that two 
determined and suicidal jihadists, with an aim of killing as many people before they die, 
would likely create a far more challenging situation for the police. The North Hollywood 
bank robbery shootings make clear that small unit tactics using readily available weapons 
and body armor present significant challenges to U.S. police capabilities.  The North 
Hollywood incident is indicative that dealing with an incident, when multiple teams of 
active shooters, with each individual determined not to escapes but cause maximum 
casualties, would be exponentially more difficult and challenging.  Consequently, it is 
important to how far major metropolitan law enforcement agencies have come in their 
preparation for active shooter and multiple active shooter incidents. 
C. COLUMBINE MASSACRE 
On April 20, 1999, in the small, suburban town of Littleton, Colorado, two 
disgruntled but academically above average high-school senior students, Dylan Klebold 
and Eric Harris, executed an all-out assault on Columbine High School during the middle 
of the school day (Rosenberg, 2000).  Klebold and Harris were characterized as bullies 
who had been bullied themselves at one time (Weinhold, 2010).  Prior to their attack, 
Klebold and Harris were placed on diversion by the district attorney’s office for breaking 
into a vehicle and stealing property from that vehicle (Erickson, 2001).  
Klebold and Harris’ plan was to kill hundreds of their peers and teachers 
(Rosenberg, 2000).  Klebold and Harris planned to kill the teachers and students by 
planting and detonating two 20-pound propane bombs in the school cafeteria and then 
shoot students as they fled the cafeteria site (Erickson, 2001).  When the bombs failed to 
detonate, Klebold and Harris entered the school and shot two students who were eating 
lunch, killing one of them (Cullen, 2004).  Klebold and Harris began firing at students 
fleeing the cafeteria, wounding five of them and killing one (Erickson, 2001).  Klebold 
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and Harris then went up the stairs to the main hallway and the hallway outside of the 
library and began firing indiscriminately (Cullen, 2004).  They shot a teacher with a 
shotgun, seriously wounding him.  That teacher later bled to death as emergency medical 
personnel were unable to enter the location (Erikson, 2001).   
About 15 minutes into the rampage, Klebold and Harris entered the library where 
56 students, two teachers and two library employees had sought concealment (Kass, 
2009).  Within seven and one-half minutes, Klebold and Harris had killed 10 students and 
seriously wounded several others by rifle and shotgun fire (Kass, 2009).  The two 
detonated several pipe bombs, which did not cause severe damage or injury.  Several of 
the students were killed execution style (Erickson, 2001).   
When information was received that Columbine High School was under attack, 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s office requested assistance from other law enforcement 
agencies (Erickson, 2001).  Within a short period of time, there were over 1,000 law 
enforcement and medical personnel on scene (Cullen, 2009).  However, the officers 
initially surrounded the school—as they were trained to do—instead of moving towards 
the shooters. 
Klebold and Harris fired at the police officers from the library window as the 
police returned fire (Cullen, 2004).  With guns, knives, and a multitude of bombs, the two 
walked the hallways and actively fired upon anything that moved (Erickson, 2001).  The 
two suspects then left the library and went to the science building where they fired at 
fleeing students.  They then returned to the cafeteria and tried to detonate the propane 
bombs by firing their weapons at the device, but were unsuccessful.  They were able to 
detonate smaller bombs, one of which was attached to a container filled with flammable 
liquid.  The bombs resulted in setting off the fire alarms and sprinkler systems throughout 
the school (Erickson, 2001). 
Klebold and Harris exchanged gunfire with the police officers from the library 
window as the police officers were providing protection to the paramedics treating 
students that had fled the building (Cullen, 2009).  After approximately 47 minutes of 
their rampage, the two turned the weapons on themselves, committing suicide (Erickson, 
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2001).  When the shooting was over, 12 students and one teacher were killed; an 
additional 21 more were injured (Rosenberg, 2000). 
This massacre changed police tactics for law enforcement agencies across the 
United States.  A paradigmatic change was brought about by Klebold and Harris since 
their killing spree demonstrated to the police and to the grief-stricken parents of the dead 
and the wounded children that previous tactics to deal with suspects posing imminent 
danger to victims were seriously flawed.  The Columbine massacre made the police 
realize that they needed to prepare for active shooters and to provide better and effective 
training to address such attacks (Chudwin, 2011).  The Columbine massacre was not the 
first school shooting in the United States, but it was the tipping point as the catalyst for 
law enforcement across the United States to change tactics required to engage active 
threats (Nichols, 2012).   
This active shooter scenario illustrated the need for rapid intervention on the part 
of responding police rather than containment. By forming contact teams from the first 
responding units and moving as quickly as possible towards the threat to engage and stop 
the suspects more victims could be saved, instead of waiting for specialized units to 
arrive and handle the situation. The need for rapid intervention, instead of waiting for 
SWAT or specialized units was proven to be paramount in cases such as Columbine since 
the goal of an active shooter is to kill as many victims as possible and not to take 
hostages (Rosegrant, 2004). 
After the Columbine event, police tactics of surrounding the location where an 
armed assault is taking place, setting up a perimeter to contain the suspects, negotiate 
with the suspects while awaiting the response of SWAT has been replaced by the “active 
shooter protocol” (Chudwin, 2011, Nichols, 2012).  Optimally, this protocol calls for a 
four-officer team to advance rapidly in a diamond-shaped wedge towards the shooters.  
The training teaches the officers to move toward the sound of gunfire and stop the 
shooter.  The goal is to stop the active shooter as quickly as possible (Cullen, 2009).   
During the Columbine event, the officers followed the traditional surround and 
isolate the suspect tactics that were taught up to that point. Officers set up a perimeter to 
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contain the suspects.  The responding officers then called the SWAT officers.  The 
mindset was that time was “on our side,” meaning that it was safer for the officers to take 
their time in responding to the threat (Borsch, 2007).  Pervious training and policies were 
set because suspect gunmen in earlier situations had sought hostages rather than 
indiscriminate killing. The Columbine event marked a significant transition that 
challenged police assumptions.  
According to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, a WestPoint psychology and 
military science professor, the shorter the response time, the more lives will be saved 
(Borsch, 2007).  Grossman calls this the “Stopwatch of Death model.”  Grossman teaches 
that the actions taken by the first, second or first few officers from an agency can 
determine the success of an incident, not that of a large mutual aid operation (Borsch, 
2007).  Grossman’s research supports the law enforcement training transition of forming 
hasty response teams from those units arriving on scene rather than waiting for 
specialized teams or mutual aid. 
Typically, officers initially responding to the Columbine assault in progress 
lacked heavy caliber weapons, protective gear and other equipment usually afforded to 
the SWAT teams to engage suspects and incidents of this magnitude.  The typical 
handguns issued to officers were adequate enough to protect the patrol officer during 
routine patrol but not adequate enough to stop Klebold and Harris from a distance 
(Erickson, 2001).  One school resource officer engaged the shooter with his handgun 
from a sizeable distance, which had little to no effect (Erickson, 2001). 
Entry into the building by law enforcement was greatly complicated by 
deficiencies in radio communication.  Officers could not communicate with each other 
because they were from different agencies and operated on different radio frequencies.  
Communications was further hampered for the SWAT team making entry due to the fire 
alarms blasting inside the school (Erickson, 2001).   
The time it took for SWAT officers to arrive in this incident cost lives of the 
innocent victims.  Klebold and Harris might have been stopped earlier by a few trained 
and equipped patrol officers who were competent to move towards the threat with the 
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ability to stop the suspects instead of waiting for SWAT.  This would likely have cut the 
casualty count by confronting the suspects effectively and quicker.   
While several tactical lessons were learned from this incident, including the need 
for uniform radio communication and the need for sufficiently accurate and powerful 
firearms such as rifles, perhaps the most important lesson was that law enforcement 
needed to change their historical tactics of surround, contain, and wait.  Waiting for 
specialized units that are more capable of dealing with complex and highly dangerous 
events generally not faced by patrol officers is a recipe for high casualty count in active 
shooter scenarios.  In case of determined suicidal jihadi terrorist attackers, the casualty 
count is likely to be much higher if the traditional tactics are followed.  The Columbine 
incident provided lessons not only to deal with psychologically imbalanced individuals 
bent upon killing as many people as they could, but also to prepare for terrorist attacks of 
a similar kind. 
D. VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY 
On April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho, a 23-year-old undergraduate student, opened 
fire inside a Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University dormitory and continued 
his assault two hours later in a classroom (Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007).  
By the time the incident was over, a total of 32 people had been killed in what was 
classified as the most lethal active shooter incident in American history (Virginia Tech 
Review Panel Report, 2007).   
Cho used two firearms to carry out his attacks, a .22 caliber Walther semi-
automatic handgun and a 9mm semi-automatic Glock 19 handgun (Hauser, 2007).  The 
shootings occurred in separate incidents.  The first incident was at West Ambler Johnston 
Hall-a dormitory, where Cho killed two students, at around 7:15 am (Virginia Tech 
Review Panel Report, 2007).  Cho left the scene and returned to his dorm room 
(Bowman, 2007). While police and emergency medical technicians were responding to 
the shootings in the dorm next door, Cho changed out of his bloodstained clothes 
(Johnson & Thornburgh, 2007).  Almost two hours later, just after 9:00 am, Cho went to 
a nearby post office and mailed a manifesto and video to NBC News (Johnson, 2007). 
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Cho then walked to Norris Hall, which contained classrooms, carrying a 
backpack.  In the backpack, Cho had several chains, locks, his two handguns and nearly 
400 rounds of ammunition (Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007).  Cho chained the 
three entrance doors shut and placed a note on the door that any attempt to open the door 
would set off a bomb.  Cho began to shoot at students and faculty on the second floor 
(Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007).  Cho shot and killed 13 students and the 
professor in classroom 206 and then 5 people in room 207.  Cho killed eleven students in 
room 211 as they attempted to barricade the door.  Cho tried several other rooms, but 
many rooms had been barricaded by students and professors (Virginia Tech Review 
Panel Report, 2007).  This rampage lasted about 10 to 12 minutes until Cho shot himself 
in the head (Gelineau, 2007).  In Norris Hall, Cho fired a minimum of 174 rounds, killing 
30 people and wounding 17 (Gelineau, 2007; Bowman, 2007).  All of the victims were 
shot at least three times and 28 of the 32 killed were shot in the head (Horwitz, 2007).  
Cho killed five faculty members and 27 students; 17 were injured by gunfire and an 
additional six were injured by jumping out of windows from the second story of the 
building in an attempt to escape (Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007). 
Police from Virginia Tech arrived within three minutes of receiving an emergency 
call.  The first five officers formed into teams—as they had been taught in active shooter 
training (Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007).  They immediately moved to the 
entrance of the building; however, it took them approximately five minutes to enter the 
barricaded building (Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007).  As the officers 
managed to make entry into the building and reached the second floor, they heard Cho 
fire his final shot (Williams, 2007).  It took Cho nine minutes to shoot 170 rounds and 
kill 30 people (Garrett, 2012).   
The Virginia Tech mass killing brought to light the need for responding officers 
to add breaching capabilities to their equipment bag as Cho had chained closed all of the 
entrances to that particular building (Blythe, 2007).  Initial confusion and errors allowed 
the Virginia Tech incident to expand.  The law enforcement officials had erred in 
assuming that the first shooting in the dorm rooms was a domestic incident.  As a result, 
the focus of law enforcement was not on the campus to search for the possible shooter.  
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The assumption that this incident was domestic related also lead to delays and mistakes 
while the first victim’s boyfriend was detained after his girlfriend had been shot by Cho.    
The police response to this active shooter threat was prompt and the officers fell 
back on their training and moved quickly towards the threat, despite their movement 
being obstructed by Cho chaining the entrance doors.  The training, especially frequent 
training between the Virginia Tech Police Department officers with the local Blacksburg 
police officers was deemed to be critical for the coordinated and efficient response of 
both the campus and the Blacksburg officers to the active shooter threat (Virginia Tech 
Review Panel Report, 2007). 
During this incident, despite the prompt response of the police, one shooter, 
armed with two handguns, was able to murder a high number of available victims, in a 
very short spell, in a target-dense location.  A critical question to address would be the 
impact of highly armed and determined multiple bands of active shooters.  If a single 
shooter with a free availability of potential victims may cause an unacceptably high 
number of casualties—causing terror in the population, disrupting society, and creating 
chaos, the potential for high casualty count when multiple shooters strike may be too 
high.  This incident also indicates that if the first responders arrive promptly, it may re-
focus the attention of the active shooter(s) towards the police and prevent them from 
killing more innocent victims. 
E. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS 
On January 8, 2011, Gabrielle Giffords, a member of the United States House of 
Representatives, was shot in the head by Jared Lee Loughner, while she was in a public 
meeting with her constituents (Lacey & Herszenhom, 2011).  Giffords was outside a 
Safeway grocery store in a town called Adobes, just outside of Tucson, Arizona when 
Loughner came running up through the crowd with a 9mm Glock 19 semi-automatic 
handgun with a 33 round magazine (Barrett, 2011).  Loughner, the sole gunman, shot 
Giffords at point blank range and then fired into the crowd (Bell and Buck, 2011).  When 
the assault was over 6 people were dead and 13 injured by Loughner (Murphy & 
Riccardi, 2011).  A federal judge and a noine-year-old girl were among the killed (Brant-
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Zawadzki, 2011).  Loughner was detained by bystanders in the crowd and held until the 
officers from Pima County Sheriff’s Department arrived (Rampton, 2011).   
Pima County Sheriff’s Department was the first law enforcement that responded 
to the shooting.  The medical training of deputies who cared for the injured played a vital 
role in the survival of some of the victims (Watkiss, 2011). According to Captain Byron 
Gwaltney, Pima County Sheriff’s Department, things could have been worse for some 
victims if it were not for the work done by some of the deputies to saves the lives of the 
victims.  The deputies had arrived several minutes before the Emergency Medical 
Services personnel (Watkiss, 2011).  The deputies carry a medical kit that was used to 
stop the bleeding for some victims.  The kit contained bandages for head wounds, 
tourniquets, a seal to cover up chest wounds and scissors to cut clothing off of victims to 
access their injuries (Watkiss, 2011). 
This is an incident where the quick response by law enforcement that carried a 
medical kit was able to save lives.  Loughner was held by citizens in the crowd until the 
arrival of law enforcement not allowing officers to form into teams to address an active 
shooter. 
Once again, this incident demonstrates a common thread that appears to bind 
active shooter incidents.  The suspect had access to freely available weaponry, high 
capacity magazines, and ample ammunition.  It is unlikely that potential active shooters 
would be held back by the lack of available firepower.  Furthermore, as in the Columbine 
and Virginia Tech incidents, the determination of the active shooters combined with the 
availability of victims resulted in a very high casualty count in a very short time.  
Although the police tactics and training during the Columbine incident were found 
wanting and thereafter changed to address active shooter incident, the Virginia Tech 
massacre revealed that a single determined shooter could accomplish a high casualty 
count prior to the arrival of the law enforcement personnel.  Giffords shooting is yet 
another reminder that active shooter incidents may evolve and culminate rapidly, and 
culminate in multiple homicides and high number of casualties. 
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F. AURORA COLORADO SHOOTING 
On July 20, 2012, a mass shooting occurred inside the Century movie theater, 
located inside a mall, in Aurora, Colorado, during the midnight showing of the film The 
Dark Knight Rises.  The sole gunman, James Holmes, bought a ticket to the movie, sat in 
the front row and about 20 minutes into the movie walked out of one of the emergency 
exits, propping it open (Carter & Pearson, 2012).  Holmes went to his vehicle parked near 
the exit and dressed into black tactical clothing that included a gas mask, ballistic vest, 
helmet, bullet resistant leggings, a throat protector, groin protector, and tactical gloves 
(Barrett & Fender, 2012).  Holmes retrieved his guns, including a 12-gauge shotgun, a 
Smith and Wesson M&P15 semi-automatic rifle with a 100 round magazine, and a Glock 
.22 caliber handgun and re-entered the theatre (Fahrenthold, 2012).  Holmes set off tear 
gas grenades and shot into the audience, killing 12 and injuring 58 (Sandell, Dolak, & 
Curry, 2012).  Holmes was arrested outside the theater minutes after the shooting 
(Brown, 2012).   
The first calls were received by 9-1-1 operators at 12:39 am and police officers 
arrived within 90 seconds (Horwitz, 2012).  Holmes was taken into custody, without 
resistance, at about 12:45 am next to his vehicle (Carter and Pearson, 2012).  Police 
officers had a difficult time getting enough ambulances to assist the injured (Hayes, 
2012).  Some of the police officers transported injured citizens in their police vehicles 
(Hayes, 2012).  The Aurora Police Department was praised for their quick response and 
for transporting some of the victims to hospitals that saved numerous lives (Strauss and 
Johnson, 2012).   
This incident illustrates the need for law enforcement personnel to be trained in 
advanced life support and have basic medical equipment to help the victims once the 
violent attack is over (Garrett, 2012).  Once again, this incident demonstrated that despite 
the prompt response of the police, one well-armed shooter could quickly kill and injure a 
high number of available victims in a target-dense environment.  Due to the chaotic 




manage to kill and injure a large number of innocent victims.  Yet, again, the threat of 
highly armed and determined active shooters presents a menacing reality confronting the 
society and to first responding personnel. 
G. MULTIPLE ACTIVE SHOOTERS 
1. Beslan Russia School Massacre 
On September 1, 2004, a large group, including students, teachers, and parents, 
was taken hostage by Islamist terrorists in Beslan, North Ossetia, at a school in an 
agricultural and industrial community of 40,000 (Giduck, 2005).  The number of 
terrorists was estimated to be at least 32.  The situation culminated in a mass murder.  
The incident lasted 3 days and ended up in hundreds of deaths and injuries (Baker and 
Glasser, 2004).  Local police and regional law enforcement agencies were unprepared for 
such large scale violent action by terrorists (Murphy, 2005).  There were over 370 deaths 
at Beslan during the three-day period; 331 were civilians, 317 hostages including 186 
children were killed.  Over 700 civilians and over 50 security forces and military 
personnel were injured (United States Army, 2007). 
As early as eight to 10 days prior to the assault, the Russian government had 
developed some intelligence that an assault might take place in a school somewhere 
around Chechnya.  However, no specific intelligence on where the attack would occur 
was available (Giduck, 2005).  The attack occurred on the first day of school, also known 
as “First September” or the “Day of Knowledge” when a large number of family 
members were present at the school, (United States Department of State, 2005).   
On this day, a group of some 30 masked individuals, dressed in camouflage, 
athletic and civilian clothing drove onto the school courtyard.  The group was well 
trained and knew the layout of the school from previous surveillance.  The attackers 
jumped from their vehicles, began barking orders, and then began firing their assault 
rifles into the crowd. (Uzzell, 2004).  The attackers were well armed and wore vests 
stocked with ammunition.  The attackers were armed with assault rifles, 40mm grenade 
launchers, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades and protective masks to counter 
debilitating gas or chemicals (Borisov, 2004).   
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The attackers acted quickly by isolating the hostages and neutralizing hostage 
ability to attempt resistance, escape or contact with anyone outside the school (United 
States Army, 2007).  The school had poor security, with one security guard and a police 
officer who happened to be in the crowd, equipped only with his sidearm.  The security 
guard and police officer engaged the terrorist and killed one attacker; however, they were 
outnumbered and outgunned.  Both were killed within seconds of the attack (Giduck, 
2005).  The terrorists searched the school and gathered people hiding in some class rooms 
on the first floor.  One of the male hostages was killed immediately as he attempted to 
resist.  Most of the hostages were taken to the gymnasium and sat on the floor (Chivers, 
2006). Some of the female students were dragged into the gymnasium by their hair where 
they were brutally raped (Giduck, 2005).  All mobile or cellular telephones were 
confiscated and the hostages were threatened that anyone found with a phone would be 
killed (Chivers, 2006).  In a seeming well-rehearsed plan, the school was promptly 
fortified and barricaded.  The various terrorists were divided into operational teams with 
specific duties.  Some focused on preparing defenses for an assault from local police and 
militia; some started assembling bombs and tripwires; a small number of terrorist 
contained the hostages.  Snipers were positioned at key locations in the school building 
complex (United States Army, 2007).  Once inside the gymnasium, explosive devices 
were set at the doorways to prevent the hostages from escaping and prevent anyone from 
entering.  The terrorist group had brought improvised explosive devices (IED)—plastic 
bottles packed with nails, bolts and screws as shrapnel and homemade dynamite.  It was 
later determined that the terrorists had 66 pounds of explosive in addition to hand and 
rocket propelled grenades.  The terrorists made it clear that they were prepared to die and 
that anyone who moved would be killed (Giduck, 2005).  Once securing of the school 
and seizing of the hostages was accomplished, the terrorists demanded the release of 
prisoners captured during the Nazran raid and the complete withdrawal of Russian troops 
from Chechnya (Forster, 2006).  Local police and other security forces gradually 
cordoned the school area off by establishing a perimeter (United States Army, 2007). 
After the third day, Russian security forces used tanks and fired into the school to 
kill or capture the terrorist responsible for this massacre (Chivers, 2006).  Eventually the 
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Russian forces breached the school walls with small explosives.  The Russian Federal 
Security Service initially reported that 32 terrorists were involved in the Beslan hostage 
taking and mass murder incident.  One of the terrorists was captured, convicted and is 
serving a life sentence in a Russian prison.  Intelligence from the captured terrorist 
indicated that the Beslan attack was intended to create an expansion of fighting across the 
Caucasus region, and to incite religious and ethnic hatred based on a compulsion for 
revenge (United States Army, 2007).  Evidence suggests that additional terrorist were 
involved beyond those killed or captured and that the group may have been as large as 70 
terrorist (Smith, 2004).   
Some of the terrorist probably escaped and about 20 were killed.  The Chechen 
terrorists used this incident to gain international attention and to seek political 
concessions from the Russian Federation concerning Chechnya (United States Army, 
2007). 
The Beslan massacre revealed some significant shortcomings in local law 
enforcement and security agencies’ preparation to deal with large-scale multiple shooter 
attack.  Due to the large number of terrorists involved in this incident, as well as the 
military style weapons and tactics the attackers used, the initial response of the security 
agencies was feeble and ineffective (Giduck, 2005).  Information about possible school 
attacks and separatists allegedly penetrating into Beslan area was brought to the attention 
of the authorities yet not acted upon.  Local authorities did not have an effective anti-
terrorism strategy and were further hampered by lack of resources and preparedness 
(United States Army, 2007).  
Prevention and protection require a strategy based on deterrence and intelligence 
(Forster, 2006).  Russian security forces had failed to deter the incursion into North 
Ossetia or to harden the potential targets by increasing security.  Furthermore, 
intelligence was misinterpreted or not used.  In spite of arresting a potential collaborator 
(who disclosed the possibility of school attacks) and indications from local sources as 
early as August 28 that rebels had penetrated Beslan, no local counter-measures were 
implemented (Forster, 2006).   
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Local police and regional law enforcement agencies were unprepared for such a 
dramatic and violent attack by terrorists.  The school was guarded by one unarmed police 
officer without an immediate means to communicate with his agency since he did not 
possess a radio (United States Army, 2007).  Local police and security forces were 
disorganized, even while establishing a perimeter to isolate the school.  Law enforcement 
leaders lacked control of an exclusion zone from terrorist gunfire.  Only about 100 meters 
separated a porous perimeter from the school area.  Civilians were allowed to meander on 
the streets among houses and apartments, and in some cases walked within shouting 
distance to the school.  Securing the site with an effective perimeter might have 
precluded armed civilians or militia from further complicating containment of the school 
site.  Many civilians were allowed to join the perimeter with their own weapons and 
others were allowed roam the streets within the cordoned off area.  The security concept 
of an inner perimeter to contain the terrorists and an outer perimeter to block civilians 
from interfering with operations was poorly conducted (United States Army, 2007).   
There was poor coordination and communication between the different security 
forces and a potentially complicating situation existed as members of Federal forces, 
army, special counterterrorism forces, Ossetia republic organizations, local police, 
untrained volunteers, and undisciplined local civilians with weapons mixed together.  
Poorly prepared and trained local police were found to be incapable of confronting the 
challenging situation.  One of the reasons police did not start arriving at the school until 
well over an hour after the terrorist seizure of the school was an inability to unlock a 
container and distribute weapons at the local police station (United States Army, 2007).  
Furthermore, lack of clarity regarding chain of command also contributed to the chaotic 
(Soldatov & Borogan, 2005). 
Clear command and control and a coordinated leadership effort toward resolving 
the crisis was not executed effectively by the Russian authorities.  Transfer of critical 
information; incorporating local expertise and knowledge of the area, facilities, and 
buildings; and integrated operations were not apparent between the local authorities, 
Republic representatives, military forces, and Federal security forces.  Not having one 
chain of command at Beslan was problematic and dysfunctional (United States Army, 
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2007).  Operational contingency plans to counter a mass hostage situation such as Beslan 
did not appear to exist.  The first command center was established and managed directly 
by the President of North Ossetia/Alania in a nearby building.  Hours later, a separate 
command center was activated by senior officials who arrived from the Russian Federal 
Security Service (FSB).  Two FSB staffs were formed during this crisis.  A military 
general officer led a Federal Operational Staff, and a separate staff was attached to three 
deputy Federal Security Service Chiefs.  These three entities appeared to work 
independently and were counter-productive to each other’s efforts.  Communications and 
information sharing appeared stove piped, rather than inter-operational (United States 
Army, 2007).   
Professional negotiators were not apparent in the unraveling crisis of hostages 
with a scene already confounded by murder of civilians during the initial hours in the 
schoolyard and building.  Negotiations, or the appearance of negotiations, were under the 
constant gaze of parents, friends, and relatives near the school (United States Army, 
2007).  Although one cannot advocate acquiescence to terrorist demands (releasing the 
prisoners captured during the Nazran raid, as demanded by the Beslan perpetrators), 
entering into serious negotiations should have been considered, particularly given the 
directly relevant and ancillary information available (Forster, 2006).   
Medical evacuation vehicles and medical facilities were unprepared to accept the 
large number of injured hostages and members of the security forces.  Attempts at triage 
were quickly overwhelmed.  The incident lacked clear evacuation routes, which 
complicated timely medical evacuations.  Private vehicles had to be pushed out of the 
roadways in some situations to allow other private vehicles, commandeered to carry 
injured hostages, a route toward area hospitals or temporary treatment points.   
2. Mumbai Terrorist Attack  
Mumbai, the commercial and entertainment capital of India, is also known as 
India’s Wall Street, its’ Hollywood, and its’ Milan. The city contributes 14 per cent of the 
income tax collection and 37 per cent of the corporate tax collection of the nation.  On 
November 26, 2008, a well-planned and coordinated terrorist attack took place in 
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Mumbai when 10 operatives trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) killed 172 people and 
wounded hundreds of others with firearms, grenades, and improvised explosive devices 
during an attack lasting three days (Jones, 2012). This Pakistan-based terrorist group, 
LeT, sees India as part of the “Crusader-Zionist-Hindu” alliance and, therefore, the 
enemy of Islam (Gera, 2010).  The group is also dedicated to Pakistan’s irredentist goals 
towards parts of Kashmir controlled by India. 
The terrorist group had boarded a small boat in Karachi at 8 a.m. on November 
22, sailed a short distance before boarding a bigger carrier.  The 10 men took over an 
Indian fishing boat, killed the crewmembers except the captain, who was later beheaded 
as they neared the Mumbai shoreline (Gera, 2010).  The attackers sailed 550 nautical 
miles along the Arabian Sea, arriving on the shores of Mumbai on November 26 
(Sengupta, 2009).   
The10 attackers were divided into four teams.  After arriving by sea, the teams 
split up and each team attacked separate locations.  Team one took a taxi to Chhatrapati 
Shivaji Terminus, also known as Victory Terminus, Mumbai’s main train station.  Each 
man carried a weapons pack, containing an AK-56 rifle, a 9-millimeter pistol, 
ammunition, hand grenades, a bomb containing a military-grade explosive, and a timer 
with instructions inscribed in Urdu (Kelly, 2009; Sengupta, 2009).  Once inside the train 
station they took out their automatic assault AK-56, a Chinese version of the AK-47 
assault rifle, and opened fire (Rabasaet et al., 2009; Gera, 2010).  The assailants began 
walking through the terminal, killing indiscriminately for 90 minutes before police 
officers arrived and forced the terrorist to leave.  This team then went to Cama and 
Albless Hospital, where they again began firing indiscriminately at innocent victims.  The 
terrorists moved to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel and continued to fire at victims along the 
way.  The attackers had a detailed diagram of the hotel’s layout.  This team was 
responsible for a third of the 172 fatalities (Rabasa et al., 2009).   
The second team walked into the Nariman House, a commercial-residential 
complex that was run by the Jewish Chabad Lubavich.  The third team of attackers went 
to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel where they began killing indiscriminately.  One of the 
terrorists was heard involved in a conversation on his cell phone, “…Everything is being 
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recorded by the media. Inflict the maximum damage.  Keepfighting.  Don’t be taken 
alive…” (Sengupta, 2009).  The battle in this hotel lasted for 17 hours before the 
terrorists were killed, and resulted in the death of 30 victims (Rabasa et al., 2009).   
The fourth team entered the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, after briefly entering the 
Leopold Café where they sprayed the occupants with automatic gunfire, killing 10 
people.  Eyewitness accounts from the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel indicated that the 
terrorists knew their way through the hidden doors and back hallways of the hotel.  The 
terrorists had a detailed diagram of the hotel’s layout (Gera, 2010).  Once the terrorists 
were inside the hotel, they shot at the occupants as they walked from floor to floor, 
killing people indiscriminately.  The siege of the Taj Mahal hotel lasted 60 hours and 
ended after Indian Commandos killed these last four terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009).   
The police in Mumbai were armed with riot gear, which contained batons, gas 
guns and single bolt action .303 rifles (High Level Enquiry Committee [HLEC], 2008).  
The police did not have adequate bulletproof vests or other equipment to shield against 
the assault rifles carried by the attackers (HLEC, 2008).  Home Minister Shivraj Patil 
(who resigned in the wake of the attacks) ordered deployment of India’s elite National 
Security Guard commandos approximately 90 minutes after the attacks began.  However, 
the mobilized units did not arrive on the scene until the next morning, some10 hours after 
the initial shooting began.  This delay gave a significant tactical advantage to the 
militants.  According to a high ranking Mumbai police official, the militants made no 
demands and had killed most of their hostages before being engaged by commandos on 
the morning of November 27 (Kronstadt, 2008).   
India’s elite National Security Guard was comprised of 56 members and those 56 
members only had 24 bulletproof vests and had no live fire practice with their weapons 
since September 27, 2007, due to a shortage of ammunition (HLEC, 2008, Sec. 1, 35).  
The terrorist attacks lasted for 60 hours until the capture of the lone surviving terrorist, 
Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel by Indian security forces.     
The lone surviving terrorist, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab was captured and 
interrogated by the police.  During his interrogation, Kasab disclosed that the group had 
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planned on escaping safely after the attacks.  Additionally, Kasab told the police that he 
was trained to “kill to the last death,” as he was instructed not to be taken alive (Sidney 
Morning Herald, 2008).  Kasab was also given orders to hide his identity and nationality 
in case he was captured alive (No Second Act for Briton, 2008).  During Kasab’s 
interrogation, he confessed that the attacks on Mumbai were conducted with the support 
of the Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) (The Globe and Mail, 2011).  Kasab was 
found guilty of 80 offenses including murder, waging war against India, possessing 
explosives and other related charges (Irani, 2010).  Kasab was sentenced to death; the 
sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court of India and Kasab was executed on 
November 21, 2012 (Ajmal Kasab Hanged, 2012). 
While the attack on Mumbai consisted of violence effected by terrorists using 
conventional firearms, grenades, and arson (use of fire both for distraction and media 
attention), the salient points were planning, preparation, and use of military style tactics.  
Furthermore, the dispersal of the attackers into separate teams indicated an effort to 
reduce and spread operational risk. The elimination of one team would not have 
prevented or halted the overall operation.  Additionally, execution of simultaneous 
attacks was responsible for creating confusion and diffusing the focus of the responding 
security forces.  The attackers displayed a sophisticated level of training, coordination, 
and stamina, firing in controlled, disciplined bursts.  In the hotels and railways stations, 
the bullet holes revealed a pattern of shots fired in groups of three, aimed at the head 
level.  With less experienced shooters, due to the difficulty of controlling an automatic 
weapon, patterns of bullet holes could be expected in the ceiling and floor.  Evidence 
therefore indicated that the Mumbai attackers had received extensive practice for their 
assault.  Besides the pattern of bullet holes, the number of casualties also revealed the 
preparation of the terrorist group (Kelly, 2009).  
Failures at different levels lead to flawed prevention, and, when the attacks began, 
inadequate response to the attack.  There were intelligence reports of this incident that 
indicated warnings were available to Indian authorities, although it is not clear just how 
actionable that intelligence was (Krondstadt, 2008).  The United States intelligence 
agencies were reportedly among those warning Indian authorities of a potential attack 
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from the sea against hotels and business centers in Mumbai.  Only a few hundred 
Intelligence Bureau officials are said to specialize in counterterrorism, a seemingly small 
number in a country of more than 1.1 billion people and the Indian Coast Guard employs 
less than 100 boats to patrol nearly 5,000 miles of shoreline (Kronstadt, 2008).   
Indian police forces suffer from a dire lack of funding and training.  Most of the 
police do not carry firearms and are armed with a stick.  The weapons are old and 
obsolete, and little to no training is provided in weapon use or engaging the active 
shooters.  Poor working conditions, archaic surveillance and communications equipment, 
and obsolete weapons further hinder their capacity.  The federal and state governments in 
India have a distressingly low police-to-population ratio of about 125 per 100,000, little 
more than half of the United Nations recommended ratio for peacetime policing 
(Kronstadt, 2008). 
Ten terrorists managed to kill or injure over 500 people. The10 terrorists were 
experienced in working together as a unit.  For example, they used hand signals to 
communicate across loud and crowded spaces.  They were sufficiently disciplined to 
continue their attack over many hours.  This had the effect of increasing the public's fear 
and keeping the incident in the news cycle for a longer period of time.  The attackers 
focused on the most crowded public areas and centers of western and Jewish activity.  
Part of the reason the Mumbai attackers were able to inflict severe casualties was 
because the local police did not engage them effectively.  Police weapons were not 
sufficiently powerful or modern to deal with the multiple shooter assault in progress.  The 
police were not trained for the type of conflict and tactics they were confronted with.  It 
took more than 12 hours for Indian commandos to arrive from hundreds of miles away, 
while terrorist handlers continued to direct operations from outside the attack zone, using 
cell phones and other portable communications devices.  This allowed the attackers the 
ability to adjust their tactics in the middle of their continuing assault (Kelly, 2009).   
The Railway Protection Force personnel in Mumbai were armed with antiquated 
weapons and had no training to deal with a well-orchestrated terrorist attack.  The 
terrorists killed 55 persons before slipping away and causing more casualties elsewhere 
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(Gera, 2010).  The media coverage of the event created challenges for law enforcement 
since police tactics were being broadcasted to the terrorists in real time.  The police 
lacked equipment for night operations, including flashlights or night vision goggles.  
Thus the police did not cut off the power to the hotel, allowing the suspects to see law 
enforcement tactics.  Whether due to technological inability or poor planning, no efforts 
were made to disrupt cell phones and other communications of the terrorist teams by the 
police (Kelly, 2009). 
Intelligence failure, inadequate counterterrorist training, and lack or obsolescence 
of the equipment, delays in the response of NSG commandos, flawed hostage-rescue 
plans, and poor strategic communications and information management, all contributed to 
a less-than-optimal response to Mumbai attackers.  These gaps suggest the need for 
improved counterterrorist coordination between national-level and local security agencies 
and for strengthened counterterrorism capabilities, including equipment, training, and 
preparedness, on the part of first responders (Jenkins, 2009). 
The Mumbai terrorist attacks used conventional tools for operation - guns and 
bombs; added to the mix were the willing attackers who were prepared to die to achieve 
their mission (Kydd, and Walter, 2006).  The 12 coordinated attacks killed 172, including 
6 Americans and wounded over 300 (Ramesh, et. al., 2008).  The attacks sent a message 
to other potential targets of terrorism, reminding others of their own vulnerability to 
multiple active shooters (Bendetto, 2005).   
H. CONCLUSIONS 
Case studies are a qualitative research approach giving the researcher the ability 
to explore an in depth analysis of specific events by gathering information using a variety 
of data collection procedures (Creswell, 2003).  These cases systematically explore 
specific variables in an effort to provide a more complete understanding of the event and 
the relationship to the research.  This chapter illustrated through the case studies how the 
descriptive functions of the cases involved contribute to our overall analysis. While 
active shooter incidents, specifically multiple active shooter incidents are rare events, law 
enforcement must has to plan and prepare to deal with these low-probability high-
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consequence events diligently.  The ability to keep a mindset essential for quick and 
effective response to such threats is only possible by effective and repetitive training for 
the first responders to: 1) respond to the location instantly, 2) form teams immediately to 
engage the active shooters, and, 3) rapidly move towards the threat to prevent additional 
casualties and to stop the threat.    
While a planned attack using assault type weaponry may not be as deadly as mass 
bombings or multiple suicide attacks, this tactic has the potential to create long-drawn-
out violent disruption in densely populated locales.  Sustained long drawn out terrorist 
attacks, besides creating fear and chaos, can also impact a region’s economy as the 
violence may deter people from regular commerce.  The Washington, DC sniper incident 
indicated how a large population could be made to change its habits due to fear of 
random shootings.  However, to predict this type of violence would be next to 
impossible, partly because as commonplace as these calamities seem, they are relatively 
rare crimes (Tanner, 2012). 
While the single active shooter events demonstrate how perpetrators armed with 
commonly available firearms can kill a large number of victims in a short time, the 
sobering fact from such events is that none of the perpetrators, including the Virginia 
Tech shooter who killed 32 people, was a trained and dedicated terrorist.  The casualty 
count is bound to be higher if the shooter is tactically trained and uses military style 
tactics to kill the maximum number of victims.  However, the most grievous possibility 
for harm would arise from a Mumbai-type multiple shooter attack.  One of the significant 
lessons learned from the Mumbai attacks is that a small number of well-trained 
determined terrorist attackers with a well thought out plan can cause major damage 
(McJunkin, 2009).  In all active shooter cases, the need effective training to deal with 
such attacks was revealed.  Additionally, police officers as first responders need to be 
equipped with upgraded weaponry to deal with terrorists as well as mentally disturbed 
active shooters.     
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEVEL OF 
PREPAREDNESS OF SELECT LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is anticipated that the city of Los Angeles will be the target of a terrorist act that 
could cause a high number of casualties or involve the use of victims as tools to gain 
notoriety or media attention (O’Sullivan, 2011).  The Los Angeles Police Department has 
adopted the MACTAC concept to mitigate the severity of terrorist actions (LAPD, 2011).  
The MACTAC concept is a regional and national concept where law enforcement 
agencies may, by necessity, combine personnel or operations to assist the local 
jurisdiction responding to major attacks, including multiple shooter assaults (LAPD, 
2011).  As an expansion of Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) tactics, 
MACTAC concepts provide officers with additional tactics to use during a complex 
incident involving multiple locations and multiple shooters.  It is important to evaluate 
and assess the policies of major metropolitan police agencies, specifically those agencies 
that patrol cities expected to be terrorist-targets, to determine what practices have been 
instituted to address multiple active shooter assault.  An assessment of similarities and/or 
differences in policies, implementation of new tactics, and   the frequency and quality of 
training provided to the patrol officers is essential to assess the readiness of the agencies.   
B. POLICY OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The Los Angeles Police Department’s official policy related to single and 
multiple active shooters is taken from its Use of Force Directive, titled Multi-Assault 
Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC), Use of Force-Tactics Directive (June 
2011): 
Immediate Action/Rapid Deployment is defined as, ‘The swift and 
immediate deployment of law enforcement resources to ongoing, life 
threatening situations where delayed deployment could otherwise result in 
death or serious bodily injury to innocent persons.’ (LAPD, 2003)   
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It is the intent of the LAPD to deploy swiftly and overwhelmingly to stop 
or interrupt the deadly actions of the assailants.  The momentum of the 
assault can be significantly reduced within the first 30 minutes of the 
incident… (LAPD, 2011).    
…In case an incident involving multiple shooters occurs within the 
jurisdiction of the LAPD, the policy of the LAPD is to dedicate all 
available resources for rapid response to the incident.  All the available 
officers in such cases are mandated to discontinue minor and non-
emergency police work.  As is the case with any significant event or 
emergency, officers are expected to radio and inform the Communications 
Division and self-deploy to a multiple shooter incident, if that incident 
were to occur in their area of assignment or on the border of an adjacent 
area.  The policy prohibits officers to not go out of their assigned divisions 
and areas of patrol in case the MACTAC incident is occurring beyond the 
border of an adjacent division.  The principle behind prohibiting officers 
to deploy far from their patrol area is to prevent portions of the city from 
becoming defenseless and vulnerable to potential additional simultaneous 
attacks… (LAPD, 2011).   
…Once a MACTAC event is identified, it is the mission of the LAPD to 
immediately respond to stop or interrupt the deadly actions of the 
perpetrators, establish on-scene command, gather and disseminate 
intelligence for situational awareness, establish perimeter control, and 
protect vital facilities.  The first responding officers will quickly assess the 
situation, assemble into contact teams, announce to Communications 
Division what is occurring and act based on their assessment.  In instances 
such as the murdering of innocent victims or the beginning of a hostage 
siege, contacts teams should disrupt the deadly actions of the perpetrators 
using the best available information.  The LAPD recognizes the possibility 
that the situation may be chaotic and information may be limited.  
However, the LAPD officers must take action based on the best available 
information as hesitation may result in a missed opportunity to control 
momentum of the assault… (LAPD, 2011). 
…Contact teams may be involved in assault, rescue, support or protection 
missions.  Once sufficient assault teams are in place the incident 
commander may identify rescue, support or protection teams.  In all 
assault situations, responding supervisors must quickly place their forces 
into effective positions to stop the hostile assailants and control the 
incident.  During a multiple assault incident, the LAPD should avoid over-
deploying its resources to a single incident as additional attacks will most 
likely take place at other locations throughout the City of Los Angeles.  
Over-deploying resources would delay response to a secondary attack and 
expose officers to unnecessary risks, making it necessary to carefully 
control the deployment of resources.  The LAPD is responsible to identify 
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pre-designated rally points throughout the City where flex teams will be 
directed to respond.  Unless the multiple assaults are taking place in the 
immediate area, flex teams will be directed to respond to a rally point, 
make ready for response to an incident and await instructions… (LAPD, 
2011). 
...Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CTCIB), 
Communications Division and Real-Time Analysis and Critical Response 
Division (RACR) will monitor and analyze activities in the City of Los 
Angeles and region for multiple deadly force incidents that are occurring 
simultaneously, a terrorist attack involving explosives and or high 
powered weapons, or a hostage siege where the armed perpetrators have 
used deadly force or are preparing to use deadly force on other people and 
potentially have access to additional victims.  When information indicates 
that a MACTAC response may be required in the City of Los Angeles or 
surrounding area, the RACR watch commander is responsible for 
notifying Communications Division, the command staff and other City 
management of the MACTAC alert… (LAPD, 2011). 
…Once at scene of a MACTAC incident, officers are responsible for 
Assessing the situation; Announcing to Communications Division and 
responding personnel the nature of the incident; rapidly Assemble 
personnel in a safe location and configure into contact teams and respond; 
all officers, supervisors, and agency management must act in a 
coordinated effort to make contact with the attackers to restrict their 
ability to maneuver, deny avenues of escape and stop their deadly 
behavior.  Contact teams, ideally made up of four officers, are to respond 
in a diamond formation to locate the assailant and stop the aggressive 
behavior.  The positions in the diamond formation are the team leader, 
assistant team leader, designated cover officer and the general purpose 
officer. (LAPD, 2011). 
While the policies provide a framework within which an organization may 
approach and resolve an issue or execute a response to a problem, policies alone do not 
explain or reflect the preparedness of an organization to deal with a low-probability, 
high-consequence event like multiple active shooter assault, especially an event that has 
not been yet faced by an organization.  Thus, an attempt was made to get insight from the 
individuals responsible for LAPD’s MACTAC training. 
C. INTERVIEWS WITH LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Commander Richard Webb of the LAPD has been closely associated with the 
development of the LAPD’s MACTAC training.  Webb was interviewed to get his insight 
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regarding LAPD’s preparation for multiple active shooter attacks.  Lieutenant Michelle 
Richards is responsible for LAPD’s tactical training.  Captain Sean Malinowski provided 
information as the in-charge of the LAPD crime center.  Captain Mike Overholser, Los 
Angeles Fire Department, provided information related to LAFD’s multiple shooter 
response. 
Webb believed that the LAPD was prepared for an active shooter scenario.  Webb 
qualified his statement by adding that the LAPD could be better prepared (R. Webb, 
personal communication, July 13, 2012).  The logistics of the training to prepare officers 
are based upon LAPD’s size.  The LAPD has approximately 10,000 sworn officers out of 
which at any given time, approximately 1,500 officers are either patrolling the streets or 
engaged in supporting roles such as detective functions, narcotics investigations, vice 
investigations, etc. (S. Malinowski, personal communication, July 11, 2012).  The 
officers patrol a large area of approximately 456 square miles and provide services to 
approximately 5 million community members (S. Malinowski, personal communication, 
July 11, 2012).   
The MACTAC training of the officers for multiple assaults, multiple location 
active shooter situations are based upon “scenario based training” (R. Webb, personal 
communication, July 13, 2012).  The training teaches the responding officers to form into 
a “contact team” using a diamond-shaped configuration once four officers arrive at an 
active shooter incident.  The contact team’s function is to quickly move towards the 
threat, make “contact” with the threat, and stop the threat.  The officers are also trained to 
immediately notify the Communications Division that they have an active shooter 
situation.  The diamond-shaped configuration allows the officer in the front to lead with a 
rifle or shotgun towards the threat while the officer in the rear walks backwards looking 
for potential threats that could attack from behind.  The two other officers in the 
configuration are trained to walk sideways to counter threats from left and right.  
Richards described the first 30 minutes of the incident as critical to prevent high 
number of casualties.  Therefore the contact team is trained to move toward the active 
shooter to engage the suspect(s) as rapidly as possible without losing the tactical edge and 
advantage.  The LAPD teaches that the more time it takes to confront the active shooter, 
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the more lives will be lost in the incident (M. Richards, personal communication, July 17, 
2012).  During active shooter incidents, in the city the size of Los Angeles with a high 
number of available patrol officers, it is anticipated that several officers would 
immediately respond to the incident.  The MACTAC training teaches the additional 
arriving officers to form multiple contact teams if they are confronting multiple shooters).   
Webb explained that it was important to instruct the officers that they should not 
self-deploy to an incident, unless the incident is occurring in their own beats.  Webb 
noted that officers have a tendency to self-deploy and this may cause a disorganized 
response to a critical event where a disciplined and focused response is required.  
Therefore, to prevent self-deployment, the LAPD supervisors or Communications 
Division dispatchers are trained to redirect officers to a specific staging area from where 
they could be properly deployed in a controlled manner.  The MACTAC training 
therefore involves LAPD supervisors and command staff and provides training in 
decision making for supervisors as team leaders.   
All employees receive10 hours of training after graduation from the academy.  
Recruits in the academy are not given the MACTAC training (M. Richards, personal 
communication, July 17, 2012).  After the initial MACTAC training, officers are sent to 
refresher training where they receive six hours of MACTAC and three hours Mobile 
Field Force tactics every other year (M. Richards, personal communication, July 17, 
2012).  The Los Angeles Police Department’s training division has a goal of providing 
repeat training every other year once the officers have completed their initial MACTAC 
training.  All the LAPD officers are expected to have received their basic MACTAC and 
Mobile Field Force training by the end of 2013 (M. Richards, personal communication, 
July 17, 2012).  Richards believed that the LAPD training was adequate to address 
multiple active shooter scenarios; however, she added that if she had an unlimited budget 
for training, she would create a training program where all officers would receive training 
every six months.  Furthermore, if she had access to more resources, Richards would 




Richards, personal communication, July 17, 2012).  Currently, only a select number of 
LAPD officers are equipped with rifles and most officers have not received training on 
how to use rifles. 
Captain Mike Overholser from the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) 
described that firefighters do receive training on how to respond to an active shooter 
incident.  The firefighters train for triage situations to assist multiple victims injured 
during an active shooter incident.  The Los Angeles Fire Department personnel receive 
24 hours of continuing education annually related to fighting fires; within the 24-hour 
training, six hours are devoted to address triage situations (M. Overholser, personal 
communication, June 22, 2012).  The Los Angeles Fire Department’s average response 
time to any shooting or emergency situation is approximately seven minutes.  The Los 
Angeles Fire Department trains their firefighters and paramedics to not enter the war or 
hot zone, until escorted by police officers.  The hot zone is the zone that contains the 
active shooter and the warm zone would an area that the active shooter has been in, has 
left, but could very easily return.  However, the LAFD personnel have not trained with 
the LAPD for such eventualities.  There is a need for formalized and ongoing training for 
LAFD’s paramedics to train with the police officers for a collaborative and concerted 
approach to entering a warm or hot zone to assist the injured victims (M. Overholser, 
personal communication, June 22, 2012).   
Webb and Richards believed that LAPD officers needed training on combat 
medicine or advanced life support systems as well as better equipment, since officers are 
trained on a basic first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and have minimal 
equipment.  Webb and Richards believed that if officers had training in combat medicine 
with the appropriate equipment they would be able to save lives of injured victims as they 
believe the LAFD would not enter in time to save many victims.  Webb and Richards 
commented that providing medical training and equipment to the officers may save the 
lives of community members as well as of the officers.  Richards believed that 
paramedics could be trained and armed to protect themselves as well as officers with 
medical combat training and equipment could save many lives.     
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D. POLICY OF THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
The Los Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s official policy related to single 
and multiple active shooters is taken from their Multi Assault Counter Terrorism Action 
Capabilities, Operations Manual: 
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s (LVMPD) vision is to 
be the safest community in America.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department’s MACTAC is a counter terrorism response concept that 
provides officers options based on tactical knowledge skills and abilities to 
respond to extreme violent incidents, which requires immediate police 
intervention.  LVMPD uses MACTAC when they are confronted with a 
single or multiple deadly force incident or incidents that occur 
simultaneously or a terrorist attack involving improvised explosive 
devices (IED), high-powered weapons, hostage siege where the armed 
subjects have used deadly physical force or are preparing to use deadly 
force on other persons and is an on-going dynamic incident (LVMPD, 
2011).  The officers must have the mindset to be physically, mentally and 
tactically prepared and to have the ability to switch from crime fighter to 
war fighter back to crime fighter.  The LVMPD response procedures 
include rally points to prevent officers from over convergence on one 
incident.  LVMPD officers are trained in squad and team level response 
tactics to address active shooters and officer rescues as well as tactical 
movement formations and techniques.  They practice and train in 
coordinated force contacts to mitigate active shooter, hostage, and/or siege 
scenarios in with their responding tactical teams.  LVMPD’s response 
includes a regional application whereby they are prepared to work with 
Federal, State, and local resources... (LVMPD, 2011). 
…During any major incident, LVMPD resources must be maintained in 
the area command.   Someone must pick up the slack.  For that reason, 
squads will be identified as either “In the box” squads or “Stay at home” 
squads.  Those assignments are made on a consistent designated rotational 
basis at all of the area commands.  ‘In the box’ squads are pre-designated 
patrol squads utilized to affect a response to a major violent incident. 
Those squads are pre-identified and scheduled in advance.  The “In the 
box” squad is assigned to respond to MACTAC incidents.  Each area 
command will have one on-duty squad prepared to be an “In the box” 
squad, which will be annotated on the daily line up and could be broken 
down into strike or buddy teams.  Officers are given policy against self-
dispatching.  A MACTAC squad is comprised of two or more strike teams 
and a squad leader.  The squad leader has two or more team leaders to lead 
their respective teams, freeing up the sergeant to control the entire squad 
and to make critical decisions at the direct point where the incident is 
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occurring.  MACTAC Strike Teams consist of four to five commissioned 
officers, which is similar to the current model employed by the United 
States Military Infantry Forces and are the base of the current LVMPD 
active shooter team.  The strike team is designed to fight as a team and is a 
tactical element of the MACTAC squad and is self-contained giving the 
team the ability to act independently from the MACTAC squad.  
Additionally, strike teams must be broken down into two officer-buddy 
teams.  The first strike team on scene is responsible for moving to 
neutralize the immediate threat to save lives.  The other responsibilities of 
the strike teams are to rescue downed officers, contain the scene or force 
protection for fire or medical response teams.  In addition the first arriving 
officer will be responsible for assessing the situation, announce the best 
intelligence they have over the radio, assemble teams and act to end the 
incident… (LVMPD, 2011).   
E. INTERVIEWS WITH THE LAS VEGAS METROLITAN POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
Sergeant Joel Martin, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), is 
responsible for the training of LVMPD personnel and provided information related to 
active shooter training.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has 
approximately 3,500 sworn officers, with anywhere between 500 to 800 on duty at one 
time, patrolling an area of 131 square miles.  Las Vegas has a population of 600,000 
citizens; however, Las Vegas gets millions of visitors, with over 38 million tourists and 
guests visiting in 2011 (J. Martin, personal communication, November 14, 2012).  The 
LVMPD provides their officers with active shooter training that includes a multiple 
assault scenario.   
Martin believed that the LVMPD was prepared for a MACTAC event in Las 
Vegas (J. Martin, personal communication, November 14, 2012).  While the LVMPD 
may not be able to stop a Mumbai-type attack from occurring, they are prepared to 
respond and confront the shooters in this type of scenario.  Martin believed that with the 
densely populated casinos, it would be vital for LVMPD officers to arrive and confront 
the suspect to stop their killing spree as quickly as possible.  Due to the amount of 
training LVMPD personnel are provided, coupled with the impromptu field scenarios 
officers are put through, Martin anticipated that officers could arrive to an active shooter 
scene in about four minutes.  Martin was unsure how many victims might be dead or 
 51 
injured in an active shooter incident within those four minutes, but believed that the 
anticipated LVMPD response time was rapid and effective enough to address the 
situation and keep the killings to a minimum (J. Martin, personal communication, 
November 14, 2012).   
Martin’s belief that the LVMPD is adequately prepared to respond to active 
shooter assaults is based upon the training provided to the officers and the field tests 
conducted to test officer preparation.  The training unit, as well as LVMPD supervisors, 
are responsible for putting officers through spontaneous tests by calling them to a 
location and field-testing their response to various active shooter scenarios.  The officers 
are put through these tests on a quarterly basis and their responses are evaluated.  The Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has at times used vacant hotels to provide 
MACTAC training to its personnel.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
officers train with the agencies that border Las Vegas such as Clark County Sheriff 
Department and Henderson Police Department.  Furthermore, the officers also train with 
the Clark County Fire Department.  Martin believed that if a multiple active shooter 
attack were to occur in the City of Las Vegas, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department would need assistance from the neighboring agencies, therefore it was 
important to have joint training exercises.  The training with the other agencies consists 
of MACTAC training and escorting the fire department personnel during active shooter 
incidents (J. Martin, personal communication, November 14, 2012).   
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department recruit officers get 20 hours of 
MACTAC training during the academy.  The sworn employees are provided a two-day 
course in MACTAC concepts, policies and tactics every year.  The Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department provides also trains the officers informally during roll 
calls to refresh their knowledge of what is expected of them during multiple active 
shooter incidents.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department MACTAC training 
also teaches about the psychological aspects of major violent incidents.   
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers are taught that the first 
team arriving at an active shooter incident is responsible to confront the assailant and stop 
his actions.  The responsibility of the second team is to assist the first team and to set up 
 52 
containment of the active shooter(s) to limit their movement.  Additional available teams 
are responsible for providing protection to the fire department personnel and paramedics 
so that expeditious rendering of medical assistance to victims could begin, which would 
further assist in potentially reducing the casualty count.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan 
Police Department officers are provided with advanced life support training and often 
train with the fire department; however, the officers are not provided with advance life 
support equipment.  Most of the LVMPD officers have purchased that equipment with 
their own funds in case they encounter multiple active shooters and victims and the 
officers are unable to get the paramedics in to assist the victims as quickly as possible.  
Since the LVMPD officers train with their fire department, the fire department response 
time is expected to be four minutes.  The fire department policy allows their paramedics 
to go into the warm zone (J. Martin, personal communication, November 14, 2012). 
If Martin had access to additional funds, he would like to train the LVMPD 
officers bimonthly in MACTAC tactics.  Martin believed that the LVMPD was very well 
prepared to respond to an active shooter incident; however, more training would save 
more lives.  If additional funds were available, Martin would like to equip each LVMPD 
police officer with urban assault rifles and equipment for advanced life support. 
F. POLICY OF CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The Chicago Police Department’s official policy related to single and multiple 
active shooters was taken from Chicago Training Directive, 2008. 
…The Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) policy regarding active shooters is 
that their department will respond immediately; assess and contain the situation; 
ensure that any further threat is neutralized; that they protect the lives of victims 
threatened by the assailants; and secure the medical aid for the injured (Chicago 
Police Department,2008).  The Chicago Police Department Active Shooter 
Incident Plan (ASIP) is designed to be utilized universally in response to any 
violent incident where an armed assailant continues to present a threat to the 
safety of community members, requiring rapid deployment instead of containment 
and negotiation (Chicago Police Department, 2008).  The Chicago Police 
Department’s  initial responsibility, when responding to an active shooter 
incident, is to mitigate the violence and neutralize the threat.  Sworn members of 
CPD are instructed to not unreasonably endanger themselves or another person to 
conform to CPD’s directives.  Officers who arrive at the scene of an active 
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shooter incident first, regardless of rank, are responsible for verification that an 
active shooter incident indeed is taking place.  That officer(s) is required to 
request assistance through the Office of Emergency Management and 
Communications (OEMC) and obtain all relevant information regarding the 
ongoing incident, including the location of the incident, suspect description and 
actions, and types of weapons used. The first responding officers must 
immediately communicate that information to additional officers who are arriving 
to assist.  As soon as possible, officer must immediately, upon the arrival of the 
first assisting unites, form a contact strike team, enter the location of the incident, 
search for the active shooters, isolate them, and stop their actions.  These actions 
are warranted immediately upon officer arrival to stop further violence and 
prevent more casualties.  When the teams of officers, who are moving in the 
direction of the assailants, discover wounded people, the information is to be 
relayed to OEMC.  This is to prevent slowing down of the teams searching for the 
assailants and digressing from their mission of stopping the threat… (Chicago 
Police Department, 2008). 
G. INTERVIEWS WITH CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Lieutenant Mark Marianovick, assigned to CPD’s SWAT team provided 
information about his agency’s MACTAC training.  Chicago covers an area of 228 
square miles with a population of 2.7 million.  The Chicago Police Department has 
approximately 11,500 sworn officers out of which about 1,500 are on duty at any given 
time (M. Marianovick, personal communication, August 3, 2012).  The Chicago Police 
Department has an active shooter training course that it offers to SWAT and patrol 
officers.  Marianovick believed that the CPD was prepared to address active shooter, 
including multiple location multiple active shooter incidents.  While the CPD could not 
stop a Mumbai style attack from occurring, it was prepared to respond effectively once an 
incident occurred.   
Marianovick averred that the CPD’s training, Active Shooter Incident Plan 
(ASIP), had prepared the officers to respond to a Mumbai-type incident.  The Chicago 
Police Department’s ASIP covers various aspects of addressing an active shooting 
incident.  These include training the officers to prepare staging areas to various tactical 
aspects that teach the officers to approach and respond to the threat.  The Chicago Police 
Department’s SWAT team provides the training to their first responders in ASIP tactics.  
Additionally, the officers are also trained in rescue maneuvers to evacuate injured 
officers and victims (M. Marianovick, personal communication, August 3, 2012).  
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Besides receiving training to address active shooter threat, the CPD officers also train to 
respond to casualty collection points, hostage holding areas, and offender holding areas.  
The Chicago Police Department officers are trained to establish four to five person teams 
and trained to move as a team.  Each team has a team leader who responsible for 
managing his/her specific team.  The Chicago Police Department’s ASIP training also 
deals with command and control of the incident, setting up of a functioning tactical 
operation center, as well as a negotiation center.  Police officers receive 16 hours of ASIP 
training in the academy as well as 8 hours of in-service training every other year.  The 
Chicago Police Department SWAT team receives approximately 176 hours of active 
shooter training a year.  However, the CPD’s command staff is not required to take the 
active shooter training courses (M. Marianovick, personal communication, August 3, 
201212).  
Marianovick believed that the training received by the CPD officers to respond to 
active shooter incidents was adequate but could be better since tactics are a perishable 
skill and must be reinforced regularly.  If Marianovick had access to more funding, he 
would prefer to train the officers more regularly, on a quarterly basis (M. Marianovick, 
personal communication, August 3, 2012).   
To prevent a disorganized response to an active shooter incident, the CPD 
dispatchers and supervisors are responsible to prevent officers from self-deploying or 
over-deploying during an incident (M. Marianovick, personal communication, August 3, 
201212).   
The Chicago Police Department’s SWAT officers are trained in advanced life 
support and have access to advanced life support equipment; however, the patrol officers 
are neither trained in advanced life support nor have access to advanced life support 
equipment.  The Chicago Police Department’s SWAT team trains with the fire 
department and paramedics and has certified five of its officers as emergency medical 
technicians and paramedics.  The Chicago Police Department’s SWAT team would 




injured.  The Chicago Police Department has a mutual aid agreement with other agencies 
within the State of Illinois for major events and has trained with other agencies for active 
shooter incidents.     
H. POLICY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The New York Police Department (NYPD) did not provide any documentation or 
copies of their active shooter policies.   
I. INTERVIEW WITH NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The information related to the NYPD’s response to an active shooter incident was 
provided by a Lieutenant assigned to their Emergency Services Division.  New York City 
is spread over 302 square miles with a population of over 8.2 million.  The New York 
Police Department employs approximately 27,000 sworn officers.  The New York Police 
Department trains its patrol officers to respond to multiple and single active shooter 
attacks.  The New York Police Department teaches a three-day course related to active-
shooter response which is a requirement for all the officers.  The officers are trained to 
confront the terrorist or active shooter as quickly as possible through a critical incident 
response team.  The New York Police Department officers are trained to quickly 
assemble into four- or five-person teams as they arrive at an active shooter incident.  The 
New York Police Department anticipates that due to the large number of officers, its 
response to an active shooter incident would be rapid.  The officers are trained to ignore 
the victims and instead address the assault, in order to stop the continuing threat to the 
life of additional potential victims.  The New York Police Department command staff 
receives in-classroom type training for active shooters incidents.  The New York Police 
Department command staff attends seminars dealing with different active shooter 
incidents, like the Mumbai incident.  The Emergency Services Division lieutenant 
believes that NYPD’s training had made the officers “really well prepared”; however, 
they could be better prepared.  If the NYPD had access to more funding, the training 
frequency would be changed to once every six months.  Furthermore, additional funding 
could be used to equip all the officers with urban assault rifles.       
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The New York Police Department officers receive basic first aid training but not 
the basic or advanced life support systems training.  The New York Police Department 
officers carry first aid medical equipment.  Additionally, the NYPD has 400 response 
vehicles that carry equipment for basic life support systems.  Similar to the other agencies 
surveyed, the New York Fire Department (FDNY), though it would respond quickly to an 
active shooter scenario, would not go into a warm zone until force protection is provided.  
Tactical paramedics assigned to the SWAT team are trained to go into a warm zone with 
the SWAT team to treat injured officers.  However, the NYPD does not train with FDNY 
for active shooter response.  The New York Police Department engages in limited 
training with other agencies and the agency representative believed that the NYPD would 
be able to handle any active shooter scenario without assistance from other agencies. 
J. CONCLUSION 
Agency representatives from all the police departments believed that their officers 
were very well prepared to respond to potential active shooter incidents within their 
jurisdictions.  There was a uniformity of response amongst these large metropolitan 
police department representatives that their agency policies and potential response to 
active shooter incidents had improved through the years.  At the same time, there was a 
universal assessment that there was room for improvement in frequency of training.  All 
the agency representative were concerned regarding funding.  They consistently shared 
the belief that funding to respond to acts of terrorism had become scarce, limiting the 
agency’s ability to provide sufficient training or to purchase required or better equipment, 
including rifles. 
Availability of additional funding for anti-terrorist response or multiple shooter 
response was deemed essential for improving agency response.  Similarly, funding was 
needed for better equipping the officers, most of whom were forced to purchase rifles 
from personal funds.   
While the agency representatives recognized that a terrorist attack or multiple 
shooter assault may not be preventable, they insisted that their agencies were prepared to 
respond rapidly and effectively once such an attack began.  The quickest potential 
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response time to an active shooter incident was estimated to be approximately four 
minutes by the LVMPD.  However, as single active shooter incidents within United 
States, for example the Aurora, Colorado incident, have demonstrated, dozens of people 
can be killed and wounded in minutes by a single active shooter. The implication is that 
in an event where multiple locations within a densely populated municipal area were to 
be attacked by teams of well-armed and determined suicidal terrorists, the number of 
casualties could be unacceptably high.  Considering the high casualty numbers in Aurora, 
Colorado incident during the first few minutes, the emphasis placed on the first 30 
minutes of an active shooter attack by Los Angeles appears excessively long.   
Furthermore, it is instructive that while active shooters may be armed with high-
powered firearms and have ample ammunition, majority of the police officers in the 
agencies surveyed are not equipped with rifles that are an essential tool to accurately and 
















Law enforcement agencies in the United States have gained significant amount of 
knowledge from the past active shooter incidents (Borsch, 2007; Chudwin, 2011; Cullen, 
2009; Nichols, 2012; Rosegrant, 2004; Virginia Tech Review Panel Report, 2007).  
However, law enforcement tactics must continue to evolve and learn from these critical 
events.   
The accumulated evidence so far is quite clear that law enforcement personnel 
must be prepared to engage these assailants rapidly and effectively, lest the terrorist 
attacks or single active shooters cause a significant loss of life in short period of time.  
One way to prepare for low probability high consequence incidents is to analyze similar 
past events to identify patterns inherent in active shooter incidents, along with identifying 
the mistakes that were made (Blythe, 2007; Borelli, 2004; Borsch, 2007; Brown, 2012; 
Cullen, 2009; Duraphe, 2009).  By gaining a better understanding of these events, and by 
learning from tactical deficiencies and mistakes of the past, the likelihood of repeating 
same mistakes and suffering consequences of those mistakes should be lessened.   
The events in Mumbai and Beslan demonstrated the challenges faced by law 
enforcement when terrorist attacks are well organized and launched by trained and 
dedicated assailants.  While it is almost impossible to completely stop every active 
shooter scenario with zero casualties, speedy and effective law enforcement response 
becomes critical in reducing the number of fatalities and injuries.  As demonstrated by 
the analysis of specific events in this thesis, active shooters are capable of causing 
multiple casualties within minutes and seconds of launching their attack.  It is axiomatic 
that the longer the shooter has access to victims and his weaponry, the event would have 
higher number of casualties.  It is extremely critical to confront the assailant as quickly as 
possible.  The analysis of policies of four major metropolitan police agencies indicates 
that that law enforcement agencies have focused their efforts to incorporate lessons 
learned from active shooter incidents into their policies.  However, it is also apparent, 
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especially if the analysis is inductively applicable to the current status of other police 
agencies, that gap in preparedness exist and law enforcement organizations still have 
room for improvement.   
B. COMMUNICATION 
The Mumbai and Beslan incidents were carried by multiple terrorists who were 
well-versed in use of their weaponry, had a well-defined plan and a mission, were well-
trained, equipped, and were determined to carry on their mission unto death.  In both the 
incidents, the attackers had the upper hand through the use of effective communication 
(Murphy, 2005; New York Police Department, 2008; Prodhan and Balachandran, 2009; 
Rabasa et al., 2009; United States Department of State, 2005).  Communications is a 
major component for law enforcement response in every actively ongoing and evolving 
incident.  However, in a large, chaotic active shooter incident, effective and controlled 
communication becomes of paramount importance (Cullen, 2009).  In Columbine 
massacre, over 900 officers responded from 36 different agencies.  These officers did not 
have the radio interoperability to communicate with each other.  Additionally, they were 
unable to engage in face-to-face communication, due to logistical difficulties and the 
shrieking alarms.  The inability to obtain current information and to disseminate the 
information effectively in real time resulted in a situation where officers were unaware of 
critical information such as location of officer deployment and operations in progress—
which could have resulted in a cross fire situation.  The situation in Beslan reflected a 
failure of communications at the most rudimentary equipment level since the school 
security officer did not even have a radio to broadcast the unfolding event.  In the North 
Hollywood bank robbery and shootout, non-verbal communication was effectively 
employed by the LAPD SWAT team; also contributing to the SWAT communication was 
the fact that the team members regularly trained together for challenging scenarios (Los 
Angeles Police Department, 1997a; Los Angeles Police Department, 1997b).  While it 
might sound redundant, it is a fact that the inability to effectively communicate during 
complex large scale chaotic situations compounds an already dangerous situation.  At a 
minimum, the lack of effective communication between the responding officers delays 
law enforcement response.    
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C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
It is axiomatic that large scale rapidly evolving events, such as those mentioned 
earlier, can be extremely chaotic and overwhelming and thus require rapid initiation of 
command and control measures to streamline operations.  In the Mumbai and Beslan 
incidents there was a tremendous amount of confusion (High Level Enquire Committee, 
2008; Kelly, 2009; Kronstadt, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010; Soldatov & Borogan, 2005; United 
States Department of State, 2005).  Consequently, the multi-agency response, involving 
the local, provincial, and federal agencies, was not well coordinated and therefore a 
focused attack on the problem was delayed, resulting in avoidable casualties (Kronstadt, 
2008; Rabasa et al., 2009; United States Department of State, 2005).  Similarly, despite 
the response of an overwhelming number of first responders to the incident location in 
the Columbine incident, a lack of uniform communication protocol between various 
agencies resulted in confusion and ineffective response, although this lack of 
communication was not as deficient as in Beslan and Mumbai..  While the North 
Hollywood bank robbery and shootout ended well, there was a lack of command and 
control at the scene, creating dangerous situations such as cross fire during this incident 
(Coffin, 2007).  These incidents illustrated the need to have a coordinated effort in their 
response, which makes it imperative for one person to declare that they are in charge 
(Moody, 2009).  
The agencies interviewed, with the exception of LVMPD, suffer from 
interoperability issues and are also unable to communicate with other agencies or their 
respective fire departments.  The city of Los Angeles was in the process of contract 
negotiations to enhance interoperability while the others still had no method of 
communication with outside agencies.  However, interoperability is assisted by all the 
interviewed agencies practicing the Incident Command System (ICS) in their response to 
complex events, which assists with the controlling and managing large-scale operations.   
The interviewed agencies have policies against self-deployment by police 
officers, unless the incident were to occur in their assigned beats; however, all the 
agencies shared a concern that officers would nevertheless self-deploy, rather than 
responding to a rally point, unless specifically ordered to that rally point.  In Los Angeles, 
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the propensity of police officers to self-deploy during major incidents has been 
recognized as one of the gaps in preparedness for Los Angeles.  The ability of the 
Communications Division dispatchers to prevent officers from self-deploying is 
hampered as the dispatchers do not have the means to see the geographical location of 
police units (personal observation).  This deficiency could be removed by utilization of 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) in police vehicles.   
D. TRAINING 
The tactical nature of policing operations requires training and repetition of 
training (Connolly, 2008).  The dynamics of the threats faced by societies have changed.  
The changing face of terrorism, which has evolved from bombings and airplane hijacking 
to utilization of aircrafts as mobile bombs and use of advanced tactics such as multiple 
assaults by trained assailants necessitates an adjustment in police response and training.  
The importance of appropriate and adequate training cannot be stressed enough.  Tactics 
are perishable skills and must be reinforced with constant practice.  Complex and 
challenging incidents such as multiple active shooter assaults require even more 
preparation as officers don’t encounter them regularly (Haberfeld, Clarke, & Sheehan, 
2012).  Consistent and regular training and preparation alone would be the key ingredient 
to a successful outcome in a multiple active shooter incident.  In all the incidents 
analyzed, Mumbai, Beslan, Columbine and to some degree North Hollywood, proper 
training would have heavily influenced the outcome.  
In Los Angeles, LAPD provides biannual training in MACTAC tactics to its 
officers and command staff.  The New York Police Department provides a three-day 
course that covers active shooters; however, no subsequent follow up training is 
provided.  Furthermore, there is no mandatory training for the NYPD’s command staff 
and its participation in active shooter training is on a volunteer basis.  The Chicago Police 
Department provides in-service training for active shooter scenarios to its officers every 
other year but no specific active shooter training is provided to the command staff.  The 
Las Vegas Municipal Police Department provides active shooter training in police 
academy and then provides updates to officers as in-service training.  The Las Vegas 
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Municipal Police Department conducts field testing of the officers, which has the benefit 
of reinforcing the tactics and training.  However, no training is offered to the LVMPD 
command staff.   
It is vital for a successful response to have a strong leader able to control and 
coordinate the resources that will converge on a scene of this nature.  While equipping 
and preparing the filed personnel to respond to active shooter incidents, training for the 
command staff of police agencies is equally important.  Absent experience in dealing 
with a unique, complex, and chaotic event, the confidence and capability required to 
control multiple shooter active assault can only come through training (Haberfeld & 
Hassell, 2007).  Representatives of all the agencies interviewed believed that more 
training would enhance their active shooter response.  Since the resources of each agency 
vary, every law enforcement agency must offer its own version of MACTAC or 
Immediate Action Rapid Deployment training to officers in and the command personnel.  
Furthermore, training of the police managers is critical since command and control of a 
large-scale dynamic evolving event places great requirements on the managers.  
Therefore leadership training should be mandated for every agency.  Not surprisingly, 
agency representatives uniformly believed that additional training would be beneficial to 
their active shooter response.   
E. MEDICAL ISSUES 
While a rapid response to and stopping an active shooter threat is critical to 
reducing casualties, it is equally important that the emergency medical services (EMS) 
personnel are prepared for such events.  In both the Mumbai and Beslan incidents, the 
fire services and EMS personnel were completely unprepared to deal with the large scale 
event and adjust their response to the enormity of the incidents (Kronstadt, 2008; United 
States Department of State, 2005).  Since the policies of EMS and fire agencies prevent 
their personnel from entering an active police operation zone, in an active shooter 
scenario, it may lead to fatalities where rescue or providing medical treatment to an 
injured victim could save lives.  For example, in the North Hollywood bank robbery and 
shootout, one of the suspects, Matasareanu, bled to death as the officers were searching 
 64 
for possible additional suspect and the EMS personnel could not enter the warm zone.  If 
officers were trained in providing basic emergency medical treatment, they might have 
been able to save Matasareanu’s life.   
Of the agencies studied, only the LVMPD officers train with their local EMS 
personnel.  None of the agencies provide the officers proper equipment for advanced life 
support, nor are they trained to apply advanced life support measures.  The agencies 
uniformly train their officers to pursue the active shooter, even in the event of an officer 
getting shot and injured.  Since this hot zone prevents approach of the EMS personnel, 
training and equipping the police officers could save the life of the injured officer. 
The Newton, Connecticut active shooter incident, like others, highlighted the fact 
that initial response by the EMS is severely handicapped due to the active ongoing police 
operational response (Mary, 2013).  Lessons from Beslan and Mumbai revealed that 
hospitals and emergency rooms can be overwhelmed and are not prepared to handle a 
multiple active shooter type scenario.  If Los Angeles or any other major metropolitan 
area were to have a multiple attack from multiple suspects similar to the terrorists’ attacks 
in Mumbai, India, the multiple casualty incident would most likely overwhelm the 
hospitals (McElwee, 2012).  The potential inability to handle the scope and magnitude of 
a mass casualty incident resulting from multiple active shooting incident could possibly 
be mitigated by training and equipping police officers in advanced trauma life support.   
F. CONCLUSION 
The analysis indicates that while law enforcement agencies in question have 
implemented active shooter training and have focused on the emerging threat, the 
magnitude and quantity of training offered could certainly be enhanced.  Police agencies 
in US have yet to face a Mumbai-type multiple active shooter assault and thus the quality 
and quantity of training offered to the responding personnel remains to be tested.  
However, lessons learned from the previous incidents raise significant concerns, 
especially when the number of casualties resulting from single active shooter incidents in 
the United States is taken into account.  It is imperative that law enforcement agencies 
dynamically review and calibrate their training based upon the lessons learned and 
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prepare their personnel not only to respond to a major assault similar to the ones in 
Mumbai and Beslan but also improve communication protocols and interoperability.  
Additionally, preparation of officers in medical triage might assist in saving lives of the 














This thesis focused on potential steps taken by four major metropolitan law 
enforcement agencies in response to terrorist attacks equivalent to the attacks in Mumbai.  
The research attempted to answer if there was any uniformity and consistency in tactics 
implemented by the select agencies. An attempt was made to determine the perceived 
level of confidence as related to implemented strategies to combat a Mumbai-type attack.  
Additionally, ancillary question focused on steps required to potentiate the MACTAC 
tactics to deal with Mumbai-type attacks 
The law enforcement agencies analyzed in this thesis have all responded to active 
shooter incidents and have implemented policy changes and instituted training to respond 
to potential multiple active shooter incidents.  All had created some form of a MACTAC 
immediate response.  The response protocol was similar and consisted of formation of 
four to five-members teams to confront and engage active shooters.  While the agencies 
may have used different terms for their potential response, there was uniformity and 
consistency in their tactics.  All the agency representatives expressed confidence in their 
ability to respond to a multiple active shooter incident.  Recommendations follow to 
enhance law enforcement response against a Mumbai style attack. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Training 
The need for responding to potential multiple active shooter assaults in their 
jurisdictions has created heavy new responsibility for local law enforcement agencies and 
added to the increasing workload of busy police agencies.  The only practical way to take 
on this responsibility in an effective manner, with a focus on mitigating loss to human 
life, is via training.  Therefore, this thesis unequivocally recommends practical and 
repetitive active shooter training for the first responding law enforcement personnel.  
This recommendation would be applicable primarily to the local police agencies as their 
personnel would respond and engage the primary threat within minutes of initiation of the 
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assault.  It is axiomatic that the responding police officers will have to fall back upon 
their training to effectively engage and stop a multiple active shooter assault threat—
since no police agency has faced such an eventuality in recent history.   
The training must include field engagement scenarios as well as table-top 
exercises.  The frequency of training must be commensurate with the perishability of 
tactics that are rarely utilized in the field.  Field testing and table-top exercises to test the 
competence and preparedness of police officers are critical for a low probability high 
consequence event such as multiple active shooter assault.  Additionally, police training 
should incorporate the concept of interoperability (Frazzano, 2010; Haberfeld and 
Hassell, 2007).  The training should consist of joint-operational exercises including all 
neighboring agencies within a region.  It is also critical that the training be provided, 
besides the first responding officers, to the managers and executives of the agency.  Any 
large scale attack or a complex incident would require leadership and a solid command 
and control of the event; therefore the leaders of police organizations also need to be 
trained.  It is also essential that the training must begin at the police academy level and 
continue during the careers of police officers and managers.   
2. Communications 
There still exists a critical need for increasing communication interoperability 
between different agencies.  The first responding agencies, including the police, fire 
department, and EMS, need a common communication platform to ensure an integrated 
response to active shooter incidents.  Additionally, in a large scale event, when several 
neighboring agencies would respond to provide mutual aid, the issue of a common 
communication platform gain further significance. First responding agencies must be 
provided with radio equipment that would allow interoperability and the ability to 
communicate with other agencies throughout the region.  Effective communication 
invariably assists with a coordinated response of resources responding from different 
agencies to an unfolding event.  Inability to communicate directly impacts safety of the 
responding personnel, including creation of cross fire situations, interferes with proper 
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deployment of resources, and results in a lack of situational awareness—which is critical 
during a dangerous and dynamic active shooter event.  
As the North Hollywood robbery and shootout demonstrated, large number of 
police officers respond and converge on an ongoing violent incident requiring additional 
resources.  The problem of self-deployment would obviously be more critical in larger 
jurisdictions as hundreds of officers would respond to an ongoing active shooter assault.  
Besides causing a chaotic situation, self-deployment would also deplete the pool of 
available officers who might be needed to respond to different venues where multiple 
active shooting assaults are occurring. While it is a natural human propensity to rush in to 
help, an uncoordinated response instead results in chaos and ineffectual deployment.  
While police agencies may already have policies against self-deployment by officers, 
they are difficult to enforce.  To prevent disorderly response and self-deployment, all law 
enforcement vehicles need to be equipped with global positioning systems.  Additionally, 
emergency dispatch operators must be equipped with abilities to monitor police officer 
positioning in real time.  
3. Equipment 
It is unconscionable that the majority of the police officers in agencies studied do 
not receive training to use police rifles.  North Hollywood incident revealed the 
inefficacy of battling suspects shooting rifles with pistols.  To not allow first responders 
access to similar, if not higher firepower, compared to terrorists is equivalent to allowing 
the terrorists and active shooters more time to operate while awaiting the few officers 
equipped with rifles to arrive at scene. All officers must be trained and receive a police 
rifle as regular part of their equipment.  When an active shooter incident occurs and the 
suspect is armed with an assault rifle, the responding patrol officers would not only be 
ineffective in stopping that threat if they are armed with a handgun, they would be 
endangered.  As the Mumbai attack revealed, inadequately equipped officers are no 
match for assailants carrying rifles.   
Due to the dynamic nature of policing, police officers have been increasingly 
burdened with more and more responsibilities.  The available literature reveals a general 
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consensus that in recent years, most police organizations have increasingly adopted 
antiterrorism efforts as their new responsibility (Pelfrey, 2007, 2009).  However, there 
does exist a need for police officers to receive training in emergency medical services in 
case of mass casualty incidents where the medical personnel would be unable to enter hot 
zones while law enforcement personnel engage multiple assailants.  Thus police officers 
should receive training in advanced life trauma support and be equipped with requisite 
equipment.  Getting paramedics into a scene of an active shooter could take significantly 
long time while the officers render an area safe.  Officers trained and equipped to provide 
initial trauma treatment can save lives, especially of their own colleagues injured in the 
gunfight.     
Emergency management service personnel and paramedics need to be trained 
with police officers and create joint teams where first responding resources are prepared 
both for engaging and neutralizing threats as well as providing life-sustaining treatment 
to the injured.  Training and equipping paramedics with firearms should be considered a 
tactic that would prove efficacious during multiple active shooter incidents.  Target rich 
locations such as schools, malls, theaters, stadia, and public places should be equipped 
with violence alarm button, similar to those placed in banks, directly connected to 
emergency dispatch services, to alert police when confronted with an active shooter.  
Sending an alarm directly to emergency dispatch operators would eliminate the need to 
call 9-1-1 and save precious time. 
4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
It is recommended that the law enforcement, as a tactical response to deal with a 
multiple active shooter assaults, deploy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), also 
commonly referred to as drones.  While large municipal police agencies deploy 
helicopters to assist police officers, in a multiple active shooter event, spread over several 
locations, there might not be enough helicopters and trained personnel available to 
provide the eagle’s eye view and updates to the officers.  Drones are significantly cheaper 
to procure and operate compared to helicopters and eliminate the risk to the flight officers 
and navigators.  In congested urban environments, drones could reach the incident 
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location much more rapidly compared to the responding officers.  While it is 
controversial to employ drones for launching attacks or missiles on potential terrorist 
suspects abroad, the special circumstances of multiple active shooter incidents should be 
considered exceptional circumstances to engage terrorists bent upon creating mass 
casualties and terrorizing the populations.  In such scenarios, deploying drones would 
keep law enforcement and the first responders safer while immediately engaging the 
suspects.   
Drones have been utilized for surveillance and reconnaissance by the military for 
decades.  Recently, especially post-September 11, 2001, UAVs have been utilized 
extensively in the battlefield (Iraq) and for counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (Tierney, 2010).  The utilization of UAVs for homeland security (HLS) missions 
in the international arena has been considered successful by the current United States 
administration.  As drone attacks have intensified, militants have become suspicious of 
each other, which has helped reduce terrorist activities (Mayer, 2009).  The United States 
administration has claimed that drone strikes in Pakistan have been effective at 
elimination of al Qaeda and Taliban leadership (Roggio & Mayer, 2010)..   
The UAVs are controlled either autonomously by computers in the aircraft or by a 
remote control navigator or pilot on the ground or in another vehicle.  While drones are 
predominately deployed by the military or CIA, there is a small but growing number of 
civilian application.   Drones have been used as a firefighting tool, for border patrol, and 
for search and rescue of people lost in the wilderness or rugged terrain where it would be 
too difficult to find people.   Aerial surveillance of large areas is made possible with low 
cost UAV systems and they are a powerful surveillance tools capable of carrying facial 
recognition systems, automated license plate scanners, thermal imaging cameras, open 
Wi-Fi and other sensors.   
Law enforcement has recently begun to utilize UAV systems for surveillance.  
The Alameda County Sheriff, Greg Ahern, deployed UAV with live video feed 
capabilities and infrared devices to obtain a birds-eye view that officers on the ground are 
incapable of getting (Chuang, 2012).  This enhances safety of the officers as they are able 
to view the suspect, what the suspect might be carrying, and the avenues of escape for the 
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suspect.  Ahern suggests that the UAVs could be used during emergencies, from high 
speed pursuits to search and rescue operations in disasters as well as proactive measures 
like finding marijuana grows in fields on public lands and in residential neighborhoods 
(Chuang, 2012).    
Drones come in all sizes and therefore can be deployed flexibly.  An UAV could 
be created big enough to carry a payload with laser sights to engage a suspect.  On the 
other hand, bird-sized drones could be utilized in a school active shooter situation by 
flying them through doorways and windows.  The laser sights on drones would enhance 
the accuracy of the weapons to shoot the active shooter while avoiding striking an 
innocent victims or hostage.  Furthermore, to prevent injuries to victims, UAVs could be 
equipped with incapacitating gas or pepper spray to neutralize an active shooter while 
avoiding any injury to victims in the area.  Police deployment of drones could also assist 
in tracking where the victims and suspects are located and thereby enhance the safe and 
rapid response of police officers and EMS personnel.  Live video feed by the drones in 
active shooting incidents would also allow the EMS personnel to determine where the 
shooters are located and extricate the victims from cold zone safely.   
Drones can provide highly specific intelligence and clear situational awareness of 
the imminent threat.  Stealth technologies can be and are easily adapted to UAVs (Nurkin 
& Drewry, 2004).  Drones are considerably less expensive, more expendable than police 
helicopters, easier to assemble and launch, and their technical capabilities continue to 
improve.  Agile aerial robots are one meter in length and weigh only a couple of pounds 
(Kumar, 2012).  These autonomous agile aerial robots are related to UAVs and can fly 
through windows into buildings and provide video streams.  Additionally, they can detect 
biochemical hazards as well as radiation.  They can be equipped with motion sensors, 
cameras and laser scanners (Kumar, 2012). 
Proactive endeavors for success in wicked problems of terrorism prevention and 
response must rely on forward thinking approach.  Use of certain technology in certain 
arenas might be controversial, but it does not make other applications of the same 
technology in different specific arenas useful.  For the law enforcement to engage 
multiple assaults at multiple locations, similar or more difficult than the Mumbai terrorist 
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attacks, use of drones would be more efficacious than relying on ground engagement 
alone and likely result in reduction of casualties and early resolution of the incident.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Even though Mumbai and Beslan incidents occurred in other countries, the 
probability of the United States experiencing a similar military style attack remains a 
serious concern.  Local law enforcement personnel, as the first responders, would bear 
the brunt of any such attack and must prepare for and be in a state of readiness.  A 
deficient response to a multiple shooter assault would increase the casualty count to an 
unacceptable and tragic level. While a low probability, high consequence incident such as 
a Mumbai style attack might be difficult to prevent, local law enforcement, especially the 
first-responding patrol officers need to be physically and mentally prepared for it. The 
frequency and quality of the officer training, suitable tactics, ability to communicate, 
visualization of the ongoing event, and proper equipment will determine how successful 
the first responding officers are in quick resolution of the incident.  The many single 
shooter attacks in the United States have proven beyond any shadow of the doubt that the 
assailants can reach a high casualty count in very short time, revealing the necessity of 
confronting the active shooters rapidly. The research in this thesis reveals the need for 
standardized and frequent training for law enforcement, enhancing interoperability, 
especially the modes of  communication among neighboring law enforcement agencies, 
as well as use of UAV’s to address potential multiple active shooter attacks rapidly, 
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